Real Property Law by Boyer, Ralph E. & Berger, Paul S.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 20 Number 2 Article 6 
12-1-1965 
Real Property Law 
Ralph E. Boyer 
Paul S. Berger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Ralph E. Boyer and Paul S. Berger, Real Property Law, 20 U. Miami L. Rev. 313 (1965) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol20/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
REAL PROPERTY LAW*
RALPH E. BOYER** AND PAUL S. BERGER***
Judicial rather than legislative activity accounted for the principal
developments in the field of real property during the period of this
survey.' Litigation involved all major areas of property law in the
usual plentiful amount. Noteworthy decisions included: application of
the estoppel by deed principle to a mortgage executed by only one of
the entireties tenants; 2 establishment of the superiority of a perfected
federal tax lien over the widow's dower in personalty; 8 validation of the
statute affording preferential tax assessment to agricultural lands; 4 and
erosion of the indemnity principle in fire insurance cases.5 Legislative
activity included clarifying amendments to the Condominium Act,6 the
most significant of which was the provision exempting pre-emptive and
similar occupancy control agreements from the rule against perpetuities.,
Because of the large number of decisions and the breadth of the
subject matter, this material represents the writers' selection of the most
noteworthy and significant developments. A reaffirmation of principles
well established in Florida, particularly as they apply to commonly recur-
ring fact situations, is generally excluded.
The style of the article is similar to that of previous surveys except
that the principal headings have been rearranged. The material is dis-
cussed in order under the following headings:
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1. The period covered is the 1963-65 biennium, or more specifically, from volume 155,
p. 128 through volume 176 of the SOuTEmRN REPORTER, second series, and applicable FEDERAL
REPORTS.
2. Hillman v. McCutchen, 166 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), discussed infra text
following note 23.
3. In re Griffin's Estate, 164 So.2d 883 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), discussed infra text following
note 85.
4. Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1965).
5. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Boswell, 167 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
6. FLA. STAT. §§ 711.01-711.23 (1963). The principal amendments are discussed infra
text following note 237.
7. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-387, § 2, amending FLA. STAT. § 711.08(2) (1963).
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New legislation when applicable is incorporated into the appropriate
topic and not discussed separately.
I. MORTGAGES
A. Deficiency Decrees and Value Determination
The foreclosure sale price has been held inconclusive for purposes of
determining a deficiency when the mortgagee is the purchaser at a
clerk's foreclosure sale.8 This result has been reached in the face of the
statute providing that "The value of the property sold by the clerk shall
be conclusively presumed to be the amount bid therefor and for which
the property was sold at the sale .... "I Before the statute several cases
involving foreclosure by a master in chancery had taken a position similar
to the statutory pronouncement, namely that the value of the property
between the parties is conclusive as to its value in considering the ques-
tion of a deficiency.'" The rule denying the conclusiveness of the value
is applicable whether the deficiency is sought in the foreclosure proceed-
ings themselves or in a separate suit at law on the note."
The fairness of the rule permitting the court to look behind the
foreclosure price is strikingly illustrated by Maudo, Inc. v. Stein.2 In
Maudo the mortgagee held a purchase money note and mortgage in the
amount of 73,000 dollars. Upon default and foreclosure the mortgagee
bid 500 dollars and purchased the property. Thereafter he instituted an
action at law to recover on the note. The trial court awarded the
mortgagee the face amount of the note plus attorney's fees and interest,
less the 500 dollars which was bid at the foreclosure sale. This was done
notwithstanding admitted evidence that the property in question was
valued from at least 82,000 to as much as 120,000 dollars. In reversing,
8. The courts of appeal in all three districts concur. Maudo, Inc. v. Stein, 171 So.2d 403
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Jonas v. Bar-Jam Corp., 170 So.2d 479 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Builders
Fin. Co. v. Ridgewood Homesites, Inc., 157 So.2d 551 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963); Kurkjian v. Fish
Carburetor Corp., 145 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
9. FLA. STAT. § 702.02(5) (1963).
10. Etter v. State Bank, 76 Fla. 203, 79 So. 724 (1918) ; Jacksonville Loan & Ins. Co. v.
Nat'l Mercantile Realty & Improvement Co., 77 Fla. 825, 82 So. 292 (1919). See also: Tendler
v. Gottlieb, 126 So.2d 308 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961), holding that the fact that the land was sold
at a substantial profit eight months later does not of itself show inadequacy of price;
Connelly v. Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 315 F.2d 683 (5th Cir.
1963), for the federal position in applying Florida law.
11. In Maudo, Inc. v. Stein, supra note 8, the question of a defidency and the value of
the foreclosed realty was raised in a subsequent law action; in Jonas v. Bar-Jam Corp., and in
Builders Fin. Co. v. Ridgewood Homesites, Inc., both supra note 8, the issue was raised in
the foreclosure proceedings.
12. 171 So.2d 403 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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the appellate court clearly indicated that the trial court was in error in
not considering the value of the property in arriving at the measure of
damages which should be awarded.
A rationale behind the apparent circumvention of the statute is
contained in Jonas v. Bar-Jam Corp.'" Therein, the Third District
Appellate Court stated: "[W]hile the provision of § 702.02(5) . . .
making the bid price conclusive as to value on a mortgage foreclosure
sale is useful for certain purposes such as determining the validity of
the sale, it is not binding on the chancellor on the matter of value when
considering an application for deficiency decree."' 4 Thus, there seems
little doubt but that the provision of section 702.02 (5) which establishes
the bid price as the value has been laid to rest."
This result is desirable, but the limits of the rule are not yet es-
tablished. The cases cited involved situations where the mortgagee was
the purchaser at the foreclosure. It is obviously fair to offset the value
of the property acquired from the debt remaining in those situations.
The same considerations, however, may not apply if a third party or out-
sider purchases the property at the foreclosure sale. In that situation it
may very well be that the best evidence of value is the price bid. Further,
the effect of the rule, if any, on foreclosures by masters' sales is not
clear. The rule has been that although the rendition of such a decree is
within the sound judicial discretion of the court," the sum bid is con-
clusive as to value unless the sale is vacated or an appeal prosecuted. 7
In any event, the assertion or retention of general equitable principles
will permit the courts to reach fair and just results.18
It must be recognized that although the bid price will not be
treated as conclusive, the courts have been quick to reverse the denial of
a deficiency where the record does not indicate sufficient equitable con-
siderations to support such denial.' In Nathanson v. Weston,20 a
purchase money second mortgagee foreclosed and purchased at the sale
13. 170 So.2d 479 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
14. Id. at 480. Denial of a deficiency decree was affirmed.
15. Although the Supreme Court of Florida does not appear to have resolved the precise
point, the conclusion seems supportable on the basis of the decisions reached in all three inter-
mediate appellate courts. See cases cited supra note 8.
16. Letchworth v. Koon, 99 Fla. 451, 127 So. 321 (1930); 2 BOYER, FLA. REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS § 32.21, at 1065 (1964). The principle is also inherent in the cases discussed in
this section.
17. See the first two cases cited supra note 10.
18. See Frank v. Levine, 159 So.2d 665 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), holding to the effect that
all equitable defenses that may be raised in equity upon application for a deficiency incident
to the foreclosure, may be raised at law in defending an action on the note.
19. In Weinstein v. Park Manor Constr. Co., 166 So.2d 842 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), the
court reversed the denial of a deficiency decree where the record did not reveal that the
defendant offered any real evidence to refute the value of the property from the price bid at
the sale.
20. 163 So.2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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for 100 dollars. There remained a deficiency in excess of 15,000 dollars.
The chancellor refused to grant the decree, apparently relying on the
mortgagor's position that at the time of the original purchase 3,200
dollars was paid in cash and prior to default some 3,500 dollars was
paid toward reducing the first and second mortgage. In reversing the
court stated "No equitable considerations appear in this record sufficient
to warrant the denial of the deficiency."21 It would appear that a
required equitable consideration is a showing that the foreclosed property
purchased by the mortgagee is at the time of foreclosure worth con-
siderably more than that amount for which it was purchased.22
B. Estoppel, or Twinkle, Twinkle Little Eye
In an apparent case of first impression, the principle of estoppel
by deed has been applied to validate in part a mortgage executed by only
one of the entireties tenants. The case is Hillman v. McCutchen,23
wherein the husband alone executed a note and mortgage encumbering
entireties property. The parties were subsequently divorced and the wife
was awarded the property as lump sum alimony. Default in the mortgage
caused the plaintiff to seek foreclosure. The wife defended on the ground
that she was never a party to the note and mortgage and counterclaimed
for cancellation. The trial court cancelled the note and mortgage and
the mortgagee appealed. The appellate court held that, although the
mortgage was ineffective to encumber the property while it was held as
an estate by the entireties, the property became a tenancy in common
upon the divorce, and the doctrine of estoppel by deed24 caused the lien
of the mortgage to attach to the after-acquired one-half interest of the
husband at the instant of the divorce. 5 Accordingly, the husband's
interest, as awarded to the wife, was subject to the lien of the mortgage.
Although the property was conveyed to the wife in the same decree which
granted the divorce, the court held that, "It has long been recognized
that one's legal condition may change in the 'twinkling of an eye' . . . We
therefore conclude that that title may pass into and out of a person by
operation of law in the 'twinkling of a legal eye.' ,2 It was accordingly
21. Id. at 42.
22. Weinstein v. Park Manor Constr. Co., supra note 19.
23. 166 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
24. The doctrine of estoppel by deed vests in a grantee the after-acquired title of a
grantor who had no title at the time of the conveyance. See generally 1 BOYER, FLA. REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 15.11(3), at 332 (1964) as to mortgages. The mortgage in issue
contained a warranty of title covenant.
25. Hillman v. McCutchen, 166 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
26. Id. at 613.
The short period involved in this case is reminiscent of the short period of time in-
volved in the operation of the Statute of Uses. In explaining that statute, CASNER & LEACH,
CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 373 (1951) state:
How long was Throckmorton seized of the land? A scintilla juris-not absolute
zero (one minus one) but relative zero (one over infinity)--a period of time shorter
than any period you can mention, but still a period of time, witness Pimbe's Case.
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held that although the same instrument that created the tenancy in
common created the wife's interest in the husband's half, the lien attached
before the wife took.
It is a delight to bear witness to the compelling logic of the court.
27
However, there are some implications which may cause difficulty. Al-
though the court did not state that the property in question was other
than homestead, caution suggests that the doctrine be limited at best
to non-homestead property. Where the property is homestead, there would
appear to be no way to avoid the conclusion that the mortgage trans-
Then in a footnote, the authors add:
Our mathematical friends tell us that "relative zero" and one-over-infinity are
old hat, pre-atonic and perhaps anti-democratic. Now they just call it zero. When
we object that it is hard to see how the Queen got anything in Pimbe's Case if
Throckmorton got zero, they answer that we would do better to go at it geometri-
cally instead of arithmetically-it's like the point at which two lines intersect, which
has a length of zero-or, better still, the point at which a tangent touches an arc,
which also has a length of zero. "Gosh," they say, "is this what you lawyers spend
your time on?" And we say, "Sure, especially at Harvard. All our time."
Somewhat along the same lines is the metamorphosis of googolplex from a very large
number into a very small number under former City of Miami tax procedures. This is detailed
in 2 BoYR, supra note 24 § 31.20, at 921.
Competition among bidders eventually resulted in the discovery of the "Googol-
plex," a quantity supposedly as near to nothing as possible-one over one with
countless zeros. This, however, was not the limit of minuteness. The "Googolplex
of a Googolplex," or "Gee Gee" for short, became the common bid in the sale of
City of Miami tax certificates.
A footnote further explains:
Miami Herald, 10-G, Sunday, Je. 24, 1956. The ingenious bidder who first
cried "googolplex" may have had a hazy memory from his higher Mathematics
course, or else, resolving to be master of the words and not their slave, used his
own definition.
Consider the following excerpt from KASNER & NEWMAN, "Mathematics And The
Imagination" (1940), p. 23:
The name "googol" was invented by a child (Dr. Kasner's nine-year-old
nephew) who was asked to think up a name for a very big number, namely 1 with
a hundred zeros after it. He was very certain that this number was not infinite and
therefore equally certain that it had to have a name. At the same time he suggested
"googol," he gave a name for a still larger number: "Googolplex." A googolplex is
much larger than a googol, but is still finite, as the inventor of the name was quick
to point out. . . .The googolplex then, is a specific finite number, with so many
zeros after the 1 that the number of zeros is a googol. A googolplex is much bigger
than a googol, much bigger even than a googol times a googol. A googol times a
googol would be 1 with 200 zeros, whereas a googolplex is a 1 with a googol of
zeros.
For further discussion of the googol and googolplex, consult Kasner and Newman, supra.
It is again emphasized that the Miami tax bidders regard the googolplex as a very small
number (the googol representing a very large number, and the googolplex, 1 over a
googol, or a very small number), and not a very large number as conceived by Messrs.
Kasner and Newman.
27. The possibility of estoppel by deed applied to conveyances by one of entireties
tenants is discussed in 1 BOYER, FLA. REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 20.02, at 445 (1964) and
in Boyer, Memorandum on Proposed Title Standard Relative to Estate by the Entirety, 32
FLA. B.J. 136 (1958). The logic of such a position was apparently not impressive to the
committee which promulgated the title standards as Title Standard 6.3, reprinted in 1 Boyer,
supra this note, at 280, takes the position that a conveyance or mortgage by only one of the
entireties tenants is a nullity and remains a nullity thereafter regardless of what later happens.
The court was either unimpressed or unaware of both of these enlightening scholastic
endeavors as it cited neither the title standard nor the opposing observations.
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action was void for failure of the wife's joinder.2" There is authority for
the proposition that a void deed does not give rise to an estoppel.29 A
similar argument as to the instrument being void can be applied to a
purported conveyance by one of the entireties tenants." This is par-
ticularly true if the one conveying tenant is the wife.3 ' On the other hand,
there seems to be no sensible reason for not applying estoppel by deed
principles to ineffective conveyances of either husband or wife to entire-
ties realty.
3 2
It also may be noted that the result of the decision may be the
ousting of the divorced wife from the possession and enjoyment of the
property which was awarded to her in the divorce proceeding. If in fact
the wife cannot purchase the interest at the mortgage foreclosure sale,
the purpose of the lump sum alimony award may be thwarted. The
purchaser at the foreclosure sale will become a tenant in common, and
if co-possession or physical division is not feasible, as it likely will not be,
he may bring a partition action and cause the whole estate to be sold with
the cotenants sharing in the proceeds. Another intriguing problem is
28. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 1. For an exhaustive treatment of the limitations on the con-
veyance and encumbrance of Florida homestead law, see articles by Shapo and Buchwald,
infra, note 67.
29. Phillips v. Lowenstein, 91 Fla. 89, 107 So. 350 (1926), indicating that a deed by a
married woman, void because of the non-joinder of her husband, may be no predicate for
an estoppel. The rule would apply with even more cogency to a void conveyance of the
homestead where the constitution requires the joinder of both parties.
30. That the joinder of both parties is necessary for a conveyance or encumbrance of
entireties property has been held or asserted many times: Cooper v. Maynard, 156 Fla. 534,
23 So.2d 734 (4945); Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So.2d 727 (1941); Newman v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 119 Fla. 641, 160 So. 745 (1935); Anderson v. Trueman,
100 Fla. 727, 130 So. 12 (1930); English v. English, 66 Fla. 427, 63 So. 822 (1913) ; Bailey v.
Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925); Anderson v. Carter, 100 So.2d 831 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1958); Penzi v. David, 122 So.2d 635 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960); Yanfanaro v. Ninos, 123 So.2d
286 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
The exceptions to the above rule that a husband can convey entireties property to the
wife without her joinder, Hunt v. Covington, 145 Fla. 706, 200 So. 76 (1941), and the
statutory agency permitting non-separated spouses to contract for the imposition of
mechanics' liens to jointly held property, LeRoy v. Reynolds, 141 Fla. 586, 193 So. 843
(1940), are not relevant to this discussion.
In the instant case the court treated the mortgage at its inception as ineffective to
operate as an encumbrance rather than being void and a nullity, unless the instrument might
be void without being void forever.
31. FLA. STAT. §§ 693.01 and 708.08 (1963), provide that a deed or mortgage by a
married woman is not valid without the joinder of her husband. A married woman's deed
without the husband's joinder is generally said to be void, Wilkins v. Lewis, 78 Fla. 78, 82
So. 762 (1919); Phillips v. Lowenstein, 91 Fla. 89, 107 So. 350 (1926). But see Hill v.
Lummus, 123 So.2d 365 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960), where estoppel was applied apparently to
punish a prior conveyancer to the married woman when the object was to defeat creditors.
The case is discussed in Boyer, Survey of Real Property Law, 16 U. MrAmi L. REv. at 151-152
(1961), wherein it is pointed out that the prophylactic effect of the decision will be largely
lost on the fraudulent grantor who has in the interim departed this earthly life.
32. Mystical common law concepts of the unity of husband and wife deserve little
more than a tolerant smile in our sophisticated society of equal rights, frequent divorce,
married women's property laws, and frequent predominant attainment of the female of the
species. The dogma that entireties tenants are seized per tout et non per my need not shock
us into silent obsequiousness.
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whether the estoppel by deed principle should be modified by the
recording act,83 and if so, whether the wife could be considered a sub-
sequent purchaser for value without notice 4 so as to come within the
protection of that statute.
C. Homestead, or a Void Mortgage is a Void Mortgage Sometimes
The problem of a mortgage executed by only one of the marital
community was compounded in Tri-County Produce Distribs., Inc. v.
Northeast Prod. Credit Ass'n.3 Therein the affected property was home-
stead held as an estate by the entireties. The wife had not signed the
mortgage instrument in the space provided, but she had signed a rider
which was attached thereto.
The dispute evolved into one between two mortgagees-the plaintiff,
which also held two prior properly executed mortgages, and the de-
fendant, which held a properly executed subsequent mortgage. The
plaintiff filed suit for reformation on the basis of mutual mistake and
asked that the instrument be reformed by the addition of the wife's
signature. The defendant contended that the mortgage was void for
failure of the wife to join in the execution of the mortgage. 6
The trial court reformed the instrument in accordance with the
plaintiff's request, but the intriguing question as to the possibility of
reformation by the addition of signatures 7 was circumvented when the
appellate court affirmed the decision on other grounds. There were three
written opinions, two 8 of them asserting an estoppel against the
mortgagors on the basis of their failure to perfect an appeal, and an
estoppel against the defendant on the basis of the recording act. The
33. The question of the effect of the recording act on the principle of estoppel is dis-
cussed in 1 BOYER, supra note 27 § 15.11(2), at 329.
34. The recording act, FLA. STAT. § 695.01 (1963), protects from unrecorded instruments
subsequent bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the unrecorded instrument. In
the instant case the wife did not have actual notice when the mortgage was executed; it was
not stated when it was recorded if at all; and the wife was a subsequent grantee as to the
husband's one-half interest, but whether she was a purchaser for value is more difficult.
Also, the question as to whether a recorded ineffective mortgage such as this one would
constitute constructive notice is not without some difficulty. A deed or instrument not
entitled to record does not constitute constructive notice although it is in fact recorded. This
rule, however, generally pertains to instruments not properly executed because of a defect in
some formalities, such as acknowledgment or witnesses. See Lassiter v. Curtiss-Bright Co.,
129 Fla. 728, 177 So. 201 (1937) ; McKeown v. Collins, 38 Fla. 276, 21 So. 103 (.1896).
35. 160 So.2d 46 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
36. See supra subsection B and note 27 as to the necessity of both husband and wife to
join in a conveyance or encumbrance of entireties property; supra note 28 as to a similar
requirement for homestead property.
37. The only support cited for the proposition was Sumner v. Rhodes, 14 Conn. 134
(1840), and this would be of doubtful applicability to the homestead "protected" by the
Florida constitution.




third opinion," by Justice Rawls, was predicated on the proposition
that the wife did sign the mortgage since there is no requirement that it
be signed in any particular place.
It is submitted that the decision has limited applicability. Because
of the default on the prior properly executed mortgages, the mortgagors
were assured of losing, their land anyway, the only point in issue being
the priorities of the third and fourth mortgage.40 However, the case raises
interesting questions which may produce litigation in the future.
D. Usury
1. ACCELERATION INTO NOTHINGNESS
A large caveat to lenders in drafting mortgages and notes with
acceleration clauses is the lesson of First Mortgage Corp. v. Stellmon.4'
In this case the face amount of the note included principal and interest
for ten years, and both the note and mortgage contained acceleration
clauses which provided that upon default the entire sum mentioned in
the note would become due and payable at the option of the holder. Upon
default the mortgagee did not seek to accelerate but rather sought to
foreclose only for the past due installments. It was held that the existence
of an acceleration clause which did not preclude the mortgagee from
recovering unearned interest upon default rendered the note usurious.
Inasmuch as the mortgagee could have foreclosed on the face amount of
the note, the note was usurious and subject to the penalties provided in
the usury statutes.
It is difficult to tell whether the penalty imposed was in accordance
with civil or criminal usury. The trial court labeled it civil usury but in
applying the civil penalty the result was extinguishment of the entire
debt. The appellate court indicated that if the face amount were recovered
and prorated over the date of the initial loan to the date of the final
decree it would amount to criminal usury. However, the result of ex-
tinguishing the debt would have been the same had the criminal penalty
been imposed.
The significance of the decision is clear: acceleration clauses must
be so worded that the possibility of recovering unearned interest is
precluded. Although the instant case might be distinguished on the ground
that this was an add-on note,42 the principle would seem equally appli-
39. Id. at 52.
40. Of course, if the third mortgage were entirely void, it is conceivable that the fore-
closure sale would bring more than enough to pay the other three mortgages and that any
surplus would go to the mortgagors and not to the third mortgagee. Because the mortgagors
failed to perfect an appeal, however, the trial court's decision is binding on them and they
cannot defeat the interest of the third mortgagee.
41. 170 So.2d 302 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
42. The add-on note contained a face amount in excess of 20,000 dollars. The principal
advanced was less than 13,000 dollars. This in effect provided for the face amount of the
note including interest over the ten year period.
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cable to notes merely representing the principal with a stipulated rate of
interest as long as the terms of the provision permit acceleration of
both principal and interest to the indicated maturity date. In any event,
attorneys would be wise to recheck all form notes and mortgages for a
possible defect in the acceleration clause. It is believed that the following
suggested form of acceleration clause will avoid the problem of the
Stellmon case:
If any sum of money herein referred to be not promptly
paid within - days next after same becomes due, then the
entire sum mentioned herein, less any unearned interest, or the
entire balance unpaid thereon, less any unearned interest, shall
forthwith or thereafter, at the option of the holder become due
and payable.
2. SECURITY, SALE AND SUBTERFUGE
The desire to circumvent usury statutes or to avoid other rules of
mortgage law may influence the parties to clothe a lending of money in
the garments of some other transaction such as a sale with provision for
repurchase. Cases involving this problem during the period of the survey
have decided the genuiness of the transaction in each instance but have
given few guidelines for future determinations. Thus in Dante v. Givens,48
the plaintiff assigned a 6,800 dollar note and mortgage to the defendant
for 3,000 dollars and a promise by the defendant to reassign in six weeks
if the plaintiff paid 3,600 dollars. The plaintiff sought cancellation on the
basis that the transaction was a usurious loan. The trial court agreed
with the plaintiff and the appellate court affirmed the finding that the
transaction was a loan rather than the sale of a mortgage. 4' The court
required the defendant to reassign the note and mortgage, return 850
dollars which was collected by the defendant from the mortgagor, and
cancelled the 3,000 dollar indebtedness and 600 dollar interest-a rather
harsh but consistent and fair result, assuming the good faith of the
assignor. However, in rightfully protecting the necessitous debtor, the
law may provide a mechanism for the unscrupulous and sophisticated
borrower to take advantage of or defraud an unsophisticated investor.
In contrast to this case, the two cases in the following paragraphs found
the transaction to be what it purported.
The Second District Court of Appeal in Mid-State Homes45 re-
affirmed the Florida position that a sale of property on credit at a price
43. 156 So.2d 13 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
44. The defendant argued that the transaction was a sale of a mortgage rather than a
loan of money. The former would not be subject to the limitations of the usury laws. Support
for this position can be found in Indian Lake Estates, Inc. v. Special Invs., Inc., 154 So.2d
883 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963), holding that a sale of installment land contracts at a discount is not
subject to the usury laws notwithstanding the fact that the sale was made on a recourse basis.
45. Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. Staines, 161 So.2d 569 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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which is higher than the asking price for cash does not bring the usury
laws into play. It is interesting to note that had the transaction been
effected through the use of a purchase money mortgage rather than an
agreement for deed, there would have been a usury problem. In essence,
one can avoid the usury laws in the sale of property by selling on credit
at a higher price instead of "lending to the buyer" via a note and
mortgage so that he can meet the purchase price. An attempt to have
a deed absolute with an option back treated as a usurious mortgage trans-
action was unsuccessful in Zmistowski v. Oxley.46 The court therein held
that "where the relationship of seller and purchaser is established between
parties the percentage of profit or loss obviously has no relation to the
usury law.""7 The plaintiff had failed to carry the burden of proof that
the transaction was other than what it purported to be and the decree
of the chancellor was upheld.
3. LENDING AGENT'S COMMISSION
In Applebaum v. Laham,48 an agent of the lender exacted a com-
mission from the borrower. The amount exacted when added to the
computation of interest rendered the transaction usurious. The trial
court took the position that although it was usurious, the fact that the
lender was not a frequent money lender and the lender's statement dis-
claiming any knowledge of the exaction by the agent, did not call for
the activation of the criminal or civil usury penalties.49 The court then
applied the amount exacted toward reduction of the principal amount of
the loan. On appeal the third district reversed, holding that the bare
statement of the lender is not enough to rebut the presumption of usury
when an agent of the lender exacts a commission. The appellate court
held that it was incumbent upon the lender to rebut the presumption by
evidence that would show that the agent was acting without the scope of
his authority.
It is difficult to reconcile the appellate court's decision with its
statement at the outset of the opinion that "The chancellor having
determined his findings of fact upon conflicting evidence and there being
evidence in the record to support his findings, same will not be interfered
with upon this appeal."5° A cynic might conclude that what the appellate
court meant was that it would not interfere with those findings that
supported its position. The chancellor found that there was no wilfull
exaction of the commission or bonus by the lender or with his knowledge.5'
46. 161 So.2d 706 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
47. Id. at 707.
48. 161 So.2d 690 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
49. FLA. STAT. §§ 687.04 and 687.07 (1963).
50. 161 So.2d 690 at 692.
51. The findings of the lower court were set out and the following portion was included:
"It follows that, (sic) that Defendant is not guilty of knowingly and willfully charging or
accepting more than the legal rate of interest."
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Although the statutes 2 require wilfulness or knowledge for the imposition
of the usury penalties, perhaps the requirement of positive evidence to
show that the lender's agent was acting without the scope of his authority
in exacting a commission is necessary in order to prevent the easy cir-
cumvention of the policy prohibiting usury. 8
E. Extension of Debt Held Not to Relieve Third Party Mortgagor
Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Cole 4 is a troublesome case. The facts are
as follows: a third party mortgagor gave a mortgage to secure the debt
of another. At the time for payment, the mortgagee accepted a new note
from the debtor, and then upon default of the new note, the mortgagee
brought foreclosure proceedings. The trial court dismissed the complaint,
apparently on the theory that the mortgage was a guarantee of the pay-
ment of a note of a third party, and that the guarantors were discharged
from their undertaking when the mortgagee accepted a new note which
extended the time for payment.
In reversing, the appellate court appears to have departed from
well settled principles of mortgage and suretyship law, 5 but the deci-
sion is probably predicated on an entirely different principle. The court
specifically stated: "We reverse upon a holding that the mortgagors
undertook a primary obligation to pay the debt which was not ex-
tinguished by the taking of the second note in a lesser amount for an
extended payment date.""6 The difficulty with this position, however, is
that no facts are given substantiating this conclusion. There is nothing
to indicate that the mortgagors ever signed the note, and in fact the
indications from the case are to the contrary. If the mortgagors did not
sign the note but simply executed the mortgage, it would seem that only
the property and not the mortgagors became responsible for securing the
maker's obligation, and the property would seem to be only secondarily
liable with primary responsibility resting on the maker.
A speculative basis for the court's statement that the debt was the
primary obligation of the mortgagors is that the maker of the note was
the alter ego of the mortgagors. The facts recite that a corporation was
the maker of the note, and the mortgagors were the corporation's
president and his wife.57 However, the court itself makes no mention of
52. FLA. STAT. § 687.04 uses the word "willfully" in imposing penalties for civil usury;
statute § 687.07 uses the words "willfully" and "knowingly" in imposing the penalties for
criminal usury.
53. This was the rationale of the court, 161 So.2d 690 at 693.
54. 161 So.2d 715 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
55. The authorities seem to be in accord that an extension to the primary obligor without
the consent of the surety or guarantor will relieve the surety or guarantor. See 3 POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY § 458 (1952).
56. 161 So.2d 715 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). (Emphasis added.)
57. Id. at 716.
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this alter ego theory, seemingly places no special significance on the rela-
tionship of the parties, and fails to state why or in what manner the
mortgagors assumed a primary obligation. It is submitted, however, that
the rest of the opinion is consistent with this theory of the case. If it is
assumed that the mortgagors were primarily liable, then it would seem
to follow that extension of the time for payment does not extinguish the
debt, and principles concerning the release of sureties have no applica-
tion.
Suretyship principles are raised by the fact that the mortgagors did
execute the mortgage to guarantee the debt of the third party corporation.
The court begins its discussion with an earlier Florida case where the
facts were similar except that the mortgage itself expressly provided that
the renewal or extension of the notes without notice would be authorized.5 8
In the present case there was no provision for such renewal or exten-
sion, and the court recognized this when it stated that "This is certainly
a reasonable reading of what the Court said in the holding above
quoted."59 However, the court went on to support the decision in the
present case by citing authority to the effect that a renewal note does not
change the character of the debt or constitute payment.
A situation analogous to the present case is commonly found where
a mortgagor conveys to a third party. Then the mortgagee enters into
an extension agreement with a third party grantee. In these cases the
authorities are in accord to the effect that the original mortgagor is
released from the primary obligation.6" The principle on which the
release is granted is that upon conveying the grantor's status is changed
from primary obligor to that of surety and that an extension without
his consent will injure his right of subrogation. It is difficult to see a
distinction in the two situations. In the present case the mortgagor
secured the maker's obligation which was to become due on a fixed date.
If in fact there is an extension of the debt without the consent of the
mortgagor, then he is being forced to subject his property to a lien in
excess of the period of time which was originally contemplated. In ad-
dition, his right of subrogation against the maker is destroyed or delayed
during the time that the debt is extended.
F. Miscellaneous
Barone v. Walters,"' involved correlation of the terms of the mort-
gage and note. Therein the second mortgage provided that default in the
first mortgage would amount to default of the second. The promissory
58. Anderson v. Trueman, 100 Fla. 727, 130 So. 12 (1930).
59. Supra note 56 at 716. The court was referring to the appellee's contention that the
Anderson case was an exception to the general rule because the mortgage in .the Anderson case
expressly authorized the extension without notice to the mortgagor.
60. Supra note 55. See also 2 BOYtER, FLA. RPAL ESTATE TRASACTIONS § 32.16 (1964).
61. Barone v. Waters, 165 So.2d 442 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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note of the second mortgage did not contain an acceleration provision as
set forth in the mortgage. Notwithstanding the omission in the note, it
was held that a reference in the note to default in the mortgage is suffi-
cient to support the acceleration.
Vance v. Fields," reaffirmed the general principle that an assign-
ment of a mortgage without an assignment of the debt creates no right
in the assignee as the mortgage is a mere incident of the debt.
G. Legislation-Devise of Mortgaged Realty
Florida Laws, chapter 65-543, creates Florida Statutes section
734.051, to provide that a specific devisee of mortgaged real property
shall not be entitled to have the mortgage paid at the expense of the
residue of the estate unless the will expressly or impliedly shows that the
testator so intended. This statute reverses the decision of Ashkenazy v.
Ashkenazy's Estate.63
II. ESTATES
A. Entireties-Implications and Presumptions
Cantor v. Palmer,64 presented a somewhat strained argument by the
wife of a deceased husband that he had created an estate by the entirety
in unaccrued rents under a lease. The husband had owned the property
individually and had executed a lease with his wife reciting that the
lessors were both himself and his wife. The rent was payable to the
husband alone, however. The wife contended that inasmuch as she
was named as lessor with her husband there arose by implication a
tenancy by the entirety in the unaccrued rents. In holding that such an
implication would be unwarranted, the court reaffirmed the principle
that unaccrued rent is an incident of the fee, and since there was no clear
intention to create the estate none would be implied. It was also pointed
out that it was necessary for the wife to join as lessor in order to release
her. inchoate dower. Hence, the designation of both as lessors was readily
explainable without the implication of an intention to create an estate
by the entirety.
In a devise to multiple persons among whom were a marital com-
munity, the interesting problem of the type and quantity of the estate of
the husband and wife was presented. The case was Dixon v. Davis,65
where the persons eligible to take were a husband and wife and three
others. The will provided that all should "share and share alike." Some
of the devisees took the position that the husband and wife should take
62. 172 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965). See 2 Boyer, supra note 60, § 32.10 (1964).
63. 140 So.2d 331 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
64. 163 So.2d 508 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
65. 155 So.2d 189 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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only a one-fourth share as tenants by the entirety. In support of this
position they argued that Florida adheres to the common law view that
husband and wife are one, and that when property is conveyed to a
husband and wife a presumption of an estate by the entirety is raised.
The court recognized the presumption but indicated that the words "share
and share alike" are words which create a tenancy in common and as
such manifest an intention contrary to the entireties' presumption. Ac-
cordingly, the husband and wife each took a one-fifth interest as tenants
in common with the other devisees.
The application of the principle of estoppel by deed to validate a
mortgage executed by only one of the entireties' tenants when an owner-
ship interest became vested in him alone has already been discussed.6"
B. Homestead
Although the homestead area is usually a source of considerable
litigation, there has been a dearth of cases during the period of this
survey. However, the few that have been considered adhere to established,
if non-sensical, principles"7 and occasionally resort to questionable logic
to reach a desired result.68
The proposition that an estate by the entirety cannot be created by
use of a conduit without consideration where homestead status has at-
tached to the property, was reaffirmed by the third district in Porter v.
Childers.69 The fact that the only lineal descendant had received 12,000
dollars with which to purchase her own home was immaterial,0 and on
death of the husband-father, the widow received only a life estate with
the daughter getting the remainder.
The temporary status of Cuban refugees was the basis of the
holding in Juarrero v. McNayr,71 wherein the Supreme Court of Florida
denied the right of homestead tax exemption to Cuban refugees. To be
66. See Hillman v. McCutchen, supra note 23.
67. For an excellent review of the problems inherent in the homestead area see Shapo,
Restraints on Alienation and Devise of Homestead: Monsters Unfettered from Florida's Past,
19 U. MiAmi L. REv. 72 (1964); Buchwald, Florida Homestead: A Restraint on Alienation
by Judicial Accretion, 19 U. Mras.rs L. REv. 114 (1964).
68. See the discussion of Brown v. Hutch, infra text following note 73.
69. 162 So.2d 301 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
70. The result may seem unfair but it is consistent. In this case the husband had re-
married and attempted to create the estate by the entirety through a conduit. The facts
indicated that the daughter had moved out of the house, was not a minor, and in fact had
received 12,000 dollars from her father which was for the purpose of purchasing her own
home. Of course, homestead status attached when the second wife moved in with her
husband. The consideration required to support a conveyance of homestead must move from
the grantee to the grantor and not from the grantor to his children. The court stated that
there was no consideration moving from the conduit or from the second wife. Would
marriage be a sufficient consideration if the conveyance were executed pursuant to such a
pre-marital agreement? See Scoville v. Scoville, 40 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1949).
71. 157 So.2d 79 (Fla. 1963).
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eligible for the tax exemption, the taxpayer must reside there in good
faith and make the property in question his permanent home.72
The most strained bit of legal reasoning in this area during the
biennium was employed to sustain a conveyance to one child under attack
by another. In Brown v. Hutch,7 a father sought to convey property on
which he resided to a daughter who cared for him in his later years. He
conveyed to her by delivery of a deed to a third party with instructions
that it be given to her on his death. After giving the deed to the third
party, the daughter married and her husband moved in with the family.
Sometime thereafter the father had a new deed prepared and sub-
stituted it for the original one in order to reflect the change in the name
of the daughter-grantee. After the father's death one of the children
sought a cancellation of the deed. The appellate court took the position
that "That which controls in a case of this type is, not whether a home-
stead status had once been in effect, but whether it existed at the time of
the death of the one claimed to be the head of the family.174 Conflicting
testimony as to whether the grantor continued to be the head of the
household was resolved in favor of the husband so that the homestead
status ceased after the second marriage of the grantee-daughter. The
court found no homestead status to have existed at the time of the
grantor's death and allowed the conveyance to stand.
There is little doubt that the result reached comports with equity and
good conscience. However, there is a serious question as to whether
the rationale of the decision comports with the law dealing with con-
veyancing and homestead. It is elementary that the validity of a deed is
determined as of the time it is delivered. This principle is equally appli-
cable to a delivery made to a third party depositary.75 Further, the court
in the instant case clearly recognized this in its discussion and citation of
authority to sustain the validity of the deed.76 It is apparent that the
court was sustaining the validity of the first deed by its showing that the
grantor gave up all control and intended to vest the title (actually a
remainder interest) in the grantee. Of course, if the first deed was
effective, the second was a nullity because the grantee already had the
estate, and the second could only be a reaffirmation at best.
Thus the apparent "holding" that the conveyance was valid because
the land was not homestead at the time of the grantor's death is seemingly
a non sequitur and nonsensical obfuscation. The character of the land as
homestead or not at the time of death is important to determine whether
72. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7.
73. 156 So.2d 683 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
74. Id. at 686 (Emphasis added.).
75. 1 BOYER, FLA. REAL ESTATE TRANSACT NS 135 (1964).
76. 156 So.2d 683, at 686-688.
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it can be devised and how it, will descend," but it is not relevant to
determine whether a previously executed deed is valid or not. Circum-
stances existing at the time of the delivery and acceptance of the deed
control its validity; not what happens afterwards.
It follows then that if the land were homestead at the time of the
delivery of the first deed, and if the deed were gratuitous or otherwise
violative of constitutional prohibitions concerning the conveyancing of
homestead, that deed would be void and would remain void. The recent
case of Reed v. Fain,78 would seem to establish that fact rather conclu-
sively. The court, it is submitted, had better alternatives available on
which to uphold the conveyance to the daughter. The facts indicate that
in all probability the land would be considered homestead at the time
of the first conveyance or delivery of the deed to the depositary. There-
fore, if we conclude that that deed was not supported by consideration,
it would be void and title would remain with the grantor.79 After the
daughter's husband moved in and became the head of the family, and the
homestead status ceased, the grantor delivered another deed to the
depositary. Since the grantor still retained title, there was no prohibition
against his now conveying, gratuitously or otherwise, and the second deed
could be given effect on delivery to the depositary. An alternative basis
would be to find consideration for the first deed. At the time of the
conveyance, the grantee was caring for the grantor. A deed in consider-
ation of her continuing to extend this care, which she did, would seem
to be supported by adequate consideration.
C. Cotenancies
Hurwitz v. C.GJ. Corp.,0 sustained a breach of contract judgment
for damages to the entire leasehold interest although only 37 per cent of
the leasehold interest was party to the action. The case grew out of a
cooperative venture whereby the scheme of organization provided for
the assignment to purchasers of individual apartments an undivided
interest as tenants in common in a long term lease. In upholding the
judgment, the appellate court pointed out that once the award is made,
the defendant would not be subject to double liability, and that the
question of apportionment between the tenants in common of the lease-
hold interest could be raised in appropriate proceedings."'
77. FLA. STAT. § 731.05 (1963), precludes the devise of a homestead if the head of a
family dies leaving either a widow or lineal descendants or both; § 731.27 provides that the
homestead shall descend as other property except in the case when the decedent is survived
by a widow and lineal descendants, in which case the widow is given a life estate and a
vested remainder is given to the lineal descendants in being at the death of the decedent.
78. 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962). The void deed was also held not cured by the twenty year
statute of limitations. See also Note, 17 U. Mmam L. REv. 643 (1963).
79. Porter v. Childers, supra note 69; articles cited supra note 67.
80. 168 So.2d 84 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
81. The court did not specify the nature of the appropriate proceedings. However, an
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The fiduciary principle of cotenanciesi that one cannot oust the other
by taking a tax deed from the state, was reaffirmed in Albury v. Gordon.2
In this case two tenants in common held title when the property was
forfeited under the Murphy Act 3 for nonpayment of taxes. Thereafter
the state conveyed the property to one of the former cotenants, and he
in turn later conveyed to his son. The son brought an action to quiet
title to the property more than twenty years from the date of the deed to
his father from the state. The court found that a constructive trust was
created in favor of the purchasing cotenant, and the fact that the twenty
year curative statute84 had run did not preclude the application of the
trust, as statutes of limitations do not apply to destroy equitable interests.
D. Dower
1. FEDERAL TAX LIEN'S PRIORITY
Questions galore with regard to the effect of a "choate" federal tax
lien on dower were raised in In re Griffin's Estate.5 In an apparent case
of first impression, the second district was confronted with the problem
of whether a widow who elected dower would take free of a federal
income tax lien which was perfected during the life of her deceased
husband. The lower court granted the wife her dower interest free and
clear of the lien both as to realty and personalty. The United States
successfully appealed, challenging only the award of personalty. This
gives rise to interesting speculation. The court stated at the outset that
"The appellant concedes that the lower court was correct in assigning
the widow a dower interest in the real property, free from the debts of the
decedent." 6 There is no question but that the appellate court was correct
in awarding the wife a dower interest in the personalty subject to the
accounting in equity might lie, or the common law action of account, or an action based on
one of the common counts such as money received for the benefit of another, would appear to
afford a satisfactory remedy. The rule that an occupying cotenant in exclusive possession is
not liable to account to the other cotenants would appear inapplicable to recovery of damages
by some of the cotenants for the benefit of all.
82. 164 So.2d 549 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). The court used the words "coparceners" and
"cotenants" interchangeably, and this is all right since the rules as to their duties and
obligations are the same. However, coparcenary related specifically to co-heirs or the descent
of property to several persons equally. The original parties in the case were technically
tenants in common and not coparceners, but since today coparceners take as tenants in
common, and there is no difference between the two estates, no harm is done by the equa-
tion of the two. See generally, 1 BOYER, FLA. RAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, § 20.03(2) (1964).
83. Fla. Laws 1937, ch. 18296. Murphy titles are probably the most secure type of tax
titles in Florida. See generally, 2 BOYER, supra note 82, §§ 31.04-31.06.
84. FLA. STAT. § 95.23 (1963) provides in pertinent part that:
After the lapse of twenty years from the record of any deed . .. purporting to
convey lands no person shall assert any claim to said lands as against the claimants
under such deed. ...
After the lapse of twenty years all such deeds ... shall be deemed valid and
effective for conveying the lands therein described, as against all persons who have
not asserted by competent record title an adverse claim.
85. 164 So.2d 883 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
86. Id. at 884.
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tax lien. However, the reason for conceding the point as to realty is
not at all clear to these authors. Perhaps the personalty was enough to
satisfy the lien, but in any event, there is reason to believe that the
government could have reached the realty both before and after the dece-
dent's death.
The doctrine set forth in In re Hester's Estate,87 would seem to apply
to a government tax lien. In that case a judgment creditor executed on
the realty of the husband during his lifetime and purchased at the execu-
tion sale. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the purchaser took
free from the wife's dower interest. Thus, if the United States had en-
forced the tax lien before the decedent's death, it is difficult to see why it
would not have prevailed over the wife's dower interest.88 In the present
case, however, the government did not seek to enforce its lien until after
the husband's death.
If the government had attempted to reach the realty and assert
priority over the wife's dower interest, the contention that federally
created liens cannot be limited by state law because of the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution would be difficult to overcome.8 9
Dower interest during the life of the husband, although it must be re-
leased in a conveyance of the real estate in order to pass an unin-
cumbered title, is hardly "choate."9 ° In fact it has been traditionally
called "inchoate" dower, and this description aptly characterizes the
nature of the interest. Inchoate dower can be lost or barred in many ways
in addition to the wife's voluntary release to her husband's grantee. If,
for example, the wife fails to survive the husband, the parties are di-
vorced, the land is sold at an execution sale, the land is taken by eminent
domain or lost because of nonpayment of taxes, or title is acquired by
adverse possession against the husband, the dower interest is lost. Com-
pared to its counterpart in personalty, the dower interest in realty is
87. 28 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1946). For an analysis of the case and attendant problems, see
Boyer & Miller, Furthering Title Marketability by Substantive Reforms with Regard to
Marital Rights, 18 U. MiAmi L. R v. 561, 583 ('1964).
88. As to realty, dower only applies to realty owned by the husband at the time of
his death and to land he had conveyed during marriage without the release of the wife's
dower. FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1963). When land is sold under execution, the husband does
not own it at the time of his death, nor did he convey it during marriage without his wife's
joinder. Thus, dower does not apply. See In re Hester's Estate, supra note 87.
89. See Ross, Federal Tax Liens-Their Impact on the Law of Real Property, 18 U.
MAMI L. REv. 183, 193 (1963). It is interesting to note that Mr. Ross predicted that in
the future the wife's dower interest could not survive the federal tax lien, but that under
existing law foreclosure of the tax lien during the decedent's lifetime would not be effective
to cut off the wife's dower interest. This conclusion flies in the face of the In re Hester
doctrine, as outlined in text accompanying note 87 supra. Cf. Cobb v. Shore, 183 F.2d 980
(D.C. Cir. 1950); United States v. Ettelson, 67 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Wis. 1946).
90. The principal case, In re Griffin's Estate, 164 So.2d 883 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964),
reasserts the principle that liens competing with the federal tax liens must not be inchoate
if they are to obtain priority, and then reviews leading cases dealing with the problem.
See also Ross, supra note 89; 2 BOYER, supra note 82, § 34.15.
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more secure and is in fact an encumbrance during the life of the husband,
and on this basis it can be distinguished from the dower interest in per-
sonalty. However, it is still defeasible, to say the least, and can be made
nonexistent 9 by the happening of any of the events previously men-
tioned.
The inferiority of the Florida homestead to federal tax liens bolsters
the conclusion that the federal lien would prevail over inchoate dower
in realty. Weitzner v. United States,92 specifically dealing with Florida
homestead law, held that a federal tax lien perfected during the husband's
life time was superior to the homestead law and that the land could be
sold to satisfy the tax lien. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held:
As in the case of inchoate dower, that which the wife has during
her husband's life time with respect to homestead ownership
is remote, uncertain and a mere expectancy or possibility and
not a vested property right, interest or title. It follows that the
tax liens of the United States were and are valid and enforce-
able against the property claimed as homestead.9
In conclusion, then, the court was eminently correct in holding that
the federal tax lien was superior to the widow's dower interest in per-
sonalty, but it is not perceived why the federal government so readily
conceded the superiority of inchoate dower as to realty.
2. PROBATE JURISDICTION
In re Coffey's Estate, 4 although more appropriately included in a
survey of probate law, dealt with the problem of the jurisdiction of the
County Judge's Court to award dower when a stranger to the probate
proceeding challenges title. The court held that the County Judge is
without jurisdiction to award dower when the testator's title is being
challenged by parties who are not taking under the will.
3. LEGISLATION-ELECTION TIME EXTENDED
Florida Laws, chapter 65-542, amends statute section 731.35, to
extend the period from sixty to seventy days in which a widow may elect to
91. Grifin's case, as a basis for holding the tax lien superior to the dower in personalty,
stated:
Until the death of her husband, the wife's dower interest is unknown, undefined
and could be made nonexistent by her husband selling the personal property or,
in fact, giving the personal property away. It remains inchoate until his death.
Since the wife's dower interest is inchoate, uncertain and remote, it does not con-
stitute an estate or interest. 164 So.2d at 886.
The realty dower interest may be known and defined, but it is renderable non-existent, and
it would seem also to be inchoate, uncertain and remote.
92. 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963).
93. 309 F.2d 45, 48 (5th Cir. 1962) (Emphasis added.).
94. 171 So.2d 568 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). For an exhaustive analysis of this case and
probate jurisdiction generally, see Comment, Bierman, Probate Jurisdiction-Limitations in
Questions of Title-A Call for Reform, 19 U. Missi L. REV. 637 (1965).
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take dower if there has been an extension of time for filing objections
to claims, or if litigation occurs which puts the assets of the estate in
doubt. The time is measured from the date to which the time for filing
objections is extended, or from the date of the final judgment determining
any such litigation or contested claims.
III. LANDLORD AND TENANT
During the last two years the landlord and tenant relationship has
been highly litigious, but the bulk of the decisions has dealt with the
reaffirmation of general principles. Space limitations require that com-
ments be limited to only the most interesting cases and those that seem
to depart from or extend well settled principles.
A. Lessee's Default-Automatic Termination?
The general principle that lease forfeiture clauses are construed as
making the lease voidable at the option of the lessor and not as causing
an automatic termination in spite of their wording was reaffirmed in
Altiere v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank.95 In this case the lessee died during the
term and the lessor waited for almost a year before bringing an action
against the lessee's estate for the accrued rent. The executor defended
on the ground that the lease provision providing for forfeiture upon
default operated as an "automatic termination" of the lease and that
the lessee's estate was liable for only one month's rent. The court noted
that provisions for forfeiture are generally included for the benefit of the
lessor, and that the lessee cannot use them as a shield for his own default.
The express provision that upon default the lessee "shall become a
tenant at sufferance" was held not to warrant a decision of automatic
termination benefiting the defaulting tenant. The decision and principle
are justified generally, but draftsmen could avoid litigation of this nature
by simply adding to the forfeiture provision "at the option or election
of the lessor."
B. Frustration
A "frustrated" tenant unsuccessfully urged frustration of purpose as
a defense to a distress action for rent in Jones Shutter Prods., Inc. v.
Edmanuel, Inc. 6 The exact principle involved was that the covenants of
a lease become unenforceable when a lease is limited to a specific purpose
and governmental action renders the premises unsuitable for such use.
The lease in question provided that the premises were "[T]o be used
and occupied by the lessee as Re-inforced Plastics and for no other
purpose or use whatsoever." The tenant was using the building as a
manufacturing plant for plastics with attendant use of flammables, and
the City of Miami closed the operation for violations of the building code.
95. 168 So.2d 693 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
96. 168 So.2d 682 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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While recognizing the general principle, the court held that the
limiting clause "Re-inforced Plastics" was not definite or specific enough
to release the tenant in the instant case. Use was not limited to manu-
facturing plastics. Hence, although the manufacturing operation could
not be conducted, there was no showing that the premises could not be
used in their present condition for purposes not constituting a fire hazard
such as the sale or display of re-inforced plastics. The case is another
illustration of the importance of careful draftsmanship. In this case a
more restricted designation of use would have inured to the benefit of
the tenant, but in other situations a too confined limitation of use
may "frustrate" him in other ways, as, for example, by precluding a
change in operations which he may find advantageous.
C. Security Deposit
Wagman v. Lefcoe, 9 involved an action by the tenants to recover a
security deposit after they had defaulted and were evicted from the
premises. It was expressly agreed that the security deposit in question
was not an advance payment of rent or a measure of the lessors' damages
as the lease provided that the lessors could apply the deposit toward
either one. The lease also provided that upon return of possession and
"expiration of the term of the lease," the lessors "shall then return to
the lessees" the balance of the security funds. The action was brought
prior to the expiration of the term as provided in the lease but after
eviction.
The court held for the lessors, the apparent basis of the decision
being that inasmuch as the lease specifically provided for the return of
the deposit upon the expiration of the lease, the lessees could not recover
before that time. This would seem to be a fair result since at the expira-
tion of the lease, and not before, the extent of the lessors' damages will
be known. Thus, at that time they will know how much of the deposit
they will be obligated to return. This result is also consistent with the
lease terms: return to be made at the expiration of the lease; lessors to
have the option to apply the deposit toward rent or damages; and the
lessors to return the balance of the funds." The only difficulty is that
the complaint was dismissed with prejudice. If such dismissal precludes
a subsequent action at the expiration of the lease, and if the foregoing
rationale is correct, then the result would be a forfeiture by the lessees
simply because they brought an action too quickly.
Another possible interpretation of the case is that the court implied
or construed a forfeiture on the basis that the deposit was to be returned
only after performance by the tenants, and the tenants have now pre-
97. 167 So.2d 765 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
98. This solution may be compared to Kanter v. Safran, 68 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1953),
subsequent proceedings 82 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1955), 99 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1958).
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cluded performance on their part. This conclusion is supported by the
following excerpts:
Since the lease provided that the security deposit would not be
returned to the lessees until the expiration of the term of the
lease, and since the return was conditioned upon the appellants'
prior performance, then obviously this action could not be
maintained.
Since the conditions precedent required by the terms of
the lease agreement did not exist or had not been performed at
the time of the institution of this action, the able trial judge was
eminently correct in dismissing the action. 9
Since penalties and forfeitures are generally not favored, the prior inter-
pretation is probably the correct one.
D. Landlord's Re-entry or "Don't Change the Lock
on Your Tenant's Door"
Default in the payment of rent does not authorize a landlord to
re-enter forcibly and prevent the tenant from occupancy, notwithstanding
an express provision for re-entry in the lease. This is the holding of Ardell
v. Milner,'00 where the landlord changed the lock on a dentist's office.
The court held that the landlord's remedy of statutory eviction pro-
ceedings' is exclusive of the right to make a forcible entry. This rule
precluding forcible self help applies although a statute"°2 gives the land-
lord a right of re-entry and the lease contains a similar provision. The
court also indicated that the loss of profits or income suffered by the
dentist would be recoverable in an action for the wrongful eviction.
In a somewhat analogous case, 10 3 it was held that a landlord may
not take the tenant's property without resort to statutory distress pro-
ceedings: at least he may not do so when the tenant's abandonment of
the premises is not clearly evident. The court indicated that Florida
Statutes section 83.08 (1963), does not give the landlord a self executing
possessory lien as the common law remedy of distress has been super-
seded by statute.
E. Percentage Leases-Single Tenant with Multiple Landlords
A somewhat novel question confronted the second district in
Alstores Realty Corp. v. Twain."4 The lessee had built a department
99. 167 So.2d 765, 766 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
100. 166 So.2d 714 (Fla. Dist. 1964). The tenant had withheld certain rentals because of
the failure of the landlord to furnish adequate air conditioning, and the amount of the
rent due was in dispute.
101. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.21-83.38 (1963).
102. FLA. STAT. § 83.05 (1963). The court also stated that the legislature intended this
statute to be read into every contract calling for the payment of rent.
103. Van Hoose v. Robbins, 165 So.2d 209 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
104. 167 So.2d 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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store on premises leased with provisions for additional rent to be com-
puted on a percentage of the gross receipts. In a few years the lessee
expanded the store by leasing an adjacent piece of property from a dif-
ferent lessor. Following the landlord's refusal to reduce the percentage
applicable to the additional rent on the basis of receipts from the entire
store, the lessee brought an action for declaratory relief seeking to have
the lease construed so as to limit computations of gross receipts for
additional rental purposes to that portion of the store which the lessor
owned. The lower court found in accordance with the lessor and the
lessee appealed. The appellate court reversed, holding that the rents
should be computed only on the basis of the receipts from sales on the
property owned by the lessor. The court recognized that a lease could
provide for a different result, but that the lease in question could not be
so construed. 10 5 The lessor argued that nothing would prevent the lessee
from moving the non-profitable departments within the store to the
part covered by the present lease and that such action would effectively
reduce the rent which was contemplated by the parties. In answer to
this, the court stated that the record did not reveal such unconscionable
diversion. This case also illustrates the importance of careful drafts-
manship.
F. Lessor's Recovery of Advance Rental After Eviction
Normally rent becomes due in accordance with the terms of the
lease, and absent a lease provision to the contrary, rent is not apportion-
able as to time.106 Advance rentals are generally not recoverable by the
tenant if he vacates or is evicted lawfully before the expiration of the
period covered by the advance rental payment.0 7 These general principles
were adhered to in Paul v. Kanter,10 8 where the court allowed the lessor
to recover from the lessee an advance rental payment, past due in ac-
cordance with the lease terms, after the lessor had evicted the tenant for
nonpayment of rent. The tenant contended that the yearly rental pay-
ment which came due should be prorated to include only the three
months prior to eviction. The court held that "An advance rental is a
contractual promise, by the tenant, to pay for the rent to be used in the
future, and to be obligated to make this payment whether he actually
uses the property for that period of time or not."'109 The holding is in
accord with the holding of the Supreme Court of Florida in Wagner v.
Rice." Paul v. Kanter,"' however, is difficult to reconcile with Deringer
105. The lease contained repeated references to the "leased premises" in referring to the
additional rent and the computation of the gross receipts, 167 So.2d 601, at 603.
106. 2 BOYER, FLA. REA ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, § 36.06 (1964).
107. Id. § 36.14.
108. 172 So.2d 26 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
109. Id. at 28.
110. 97 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1957).
111. Supra note 108.
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v. Pappas,112 although the same Justice wrote both opinions and appar-
ently distinguished the cases to his own satisfaction.
In Deringer, the lease period was five annual terms running from
June 6 to June 5, with the rent being paid in four installments on the
first days of January, February, March and April. The tenant was evicted
on April 1, and it was agreed that the landlord resumed possession for
his own benefit"' and not for the purpose of mitigating the tenant's
liability for the lessor's damages. The tenant contended that he should
not be liable at all for the April rental payment since he was evicted on
that date, but the court held that the four rental payments were for the
entire year's use of the premises and that he should be liable for so much
of the year as he had use of the premises. In this case it amounted to
ten-twelfths of a year and this included a portion of the April rental
payment.
The court in Kanter distinguished Deringer on the ground that it
involved a security deposit and the determination of damages. Although
this is true, the cases nevertheless seem in conflict concerning the recov-
ery of rentals. In Deringer the court stated: "It is well settled that the
landlord may only recover the pro rata share of the rent during the
period the tenant actually was in possession.""' 4 Wagner v. Rice,115 was
cited as authority for this statement, but it is submitted that Wagner
is no authority for a rule of apportionment.1
It would seem that if the court were to be consistent with previous
holdings, the landlord in Deringer should have recovered either all or
none of the rental payment of April 1. In view of the fact that the parties
treated April 1 as the date of eviction,"' although actual recovery of
possession was not until April 5, the tenant's position of no liability for
that payment seems correct. The landlord should not complain because
he agreed to the terms of the lease specifying on what days the rent
should become due, and he brought about the eviction on the day the
rent payment was due. To avoid this result, the court pointed out that
the lease was not on a monthly basis and that the rent reserved was for
an entire year." 8 Thus, it treated the rent as accruing gradually, in spite
of lease provisions to the contrary, and terminated the liability for rent
112. 164 So.2d 569 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
113. This terminates the landlord-tenant relationship and any further liability of the
tenant. Williams v. Aeroland Oil Co., 155 Fla. 114, 20 So.2d 346 (1944); Kanter v. Safran,
68 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1953); Wagner v. Rice, 97 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1957).
114. 164 So.2d 569, at 571.
115. 97 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1957).
116. In fact Wagner supports just the opposite conclusion, as the landlord was allowed
to recover an advance guaranteed rental payment for the entire year after the landlord had
evicted the tenant for not making that payment, and possession was recovered about three
months after the due date.
117. 164 So.2d 569, at 571.
118. Ibid.
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on the date of eviction; but liability up to that time was ten-twelfths of
a year's rental. A rule of apportionment such as applied in Deringer has
been appraised as being fair, sensible, and desirable," 9 but it is submitted
that in Florida it is a departure from previous holdings.
G. Tenant's Liquor License Subject to Landlord's Lien
In a case of first impression the first district has held that a liquor
license is subject to a landlord's lien for rent. 2° Although recognizing
the privilege-right dichotomy, the court reasoned that the scarcity of the
license creates a property right. Inasmuch as the landlord's lien attaches
to all property of the lessee which is usually kept on the premises, coupled
with the requirement that the license be displayed on the licensed prem-
ises, the court concluded that the lien attached.' 2 '
H. Declaratory Relief-Unreasonable Withholding of
Consent to Lessee's Assignment
Although the Declaratory Judgment Act has not received the lati-
tudinous treatment it should be accorded, it is refreshing to see that its
purpose was not frustrated in Tulip Realty Co. v. Fuhrer.'22 It should
now appear settled that a clause in a lease providing for assignability by
the lessee subject to the lessor's consent, and providing that such consent
will not unreasonably be withheld, states a claim which is subject to
declaratory relief. The Second District Court of Appeal did not mince
any words in holding that the value of the Act is of particular significance
in a case such as this.
IV. ZONING
As might be expected, zoning has been an active source of litigation.
The following principles have been reaffirmed: (1) failure to exhaust
administrative remedies precludes judicial review;' 2 (2) zoning is a
function of the zoning authorities and not the courts; 24 (3) good faith
119. 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, § 375, at 228 (1952).
120. Yarbrough v. Villeneuve, 160 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
121. Although the problem was not raised in the case, it seemed interesting to ponder
the question of foreclosing the lien. What would happen upon a sale? The regulatory
burdens involved in the ownership of a liquor license, and the difficulty in obtaining
approval of the Beverage commission might pose a problem from the standpoint of the
purchaser. However, it is clear that any purchaser would have to be able to comply with
the Beverage Department's standards before he could use the property he purchased. It is
interesting to find that the Beverage Department contemplated a decision such as the one
reached here, as Rule 65A-2.06 of the Beverage Department provides in pertinent part:
(7) Forced Sale: In the case of a foreclosure or a forced judicial sale under
distress . . . the license involved shall be transferred to the purchaser at such sale
upon proper application being made therefor. ...
122. 155 So.2d 637 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
123. Bird Road Baptist Church, Inc. v. Stevens, 155 So.2d 420 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
124. Hillsborough County v. Twin Lakes Mobile Home Village, Inc., 166 So.2d 191
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). However, the case affirmed a post decretal order to confirm the owner's
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reliance upon existing zoning will raise an equitable estoppel against a
city;' 25 and (4) a property owner has no vested rights in existing zoning
in the absence of expenditures on his land in compliance therewith.' 26
A. Fairly Debatable Rule-A Nick in the Armor
The well settled rule that zoning decisions of local authorities will
not be disturbed if application of the regulation to the property in ques-
tion is "fairly debatable" has long been a convenient vehicle allowing
judicial avoidance of a review of the merits of zoning cases. 27 Adherence
to this proposition has been consistent but not inflexible, as challenged
regulations held arbitrary or unreasonable can be characterized as not
"fairly debatable" and therefore without the scope of the rule.'28
In Burritt v. Harris,129 the property owner had land which abutted
an airport. His land was zoned Residential A, the most restrictive classifi-
cation, although in fact the predominant zoning in the area was Industrial.
Seven petitions of neighboring owners had been granted changing the
classification to Industrial. Supporting the reasonableness of the indus-
trial classification were the shrill screeches of the screaming jets and the
wafted odors of a nearby paper pulp plant. Nevertheless, this particular
land owner was repeatedly denied rezoning petitions, and thus he sought
equitable relief. The lower court dismissed the suit, and the district
court affirmed on the fairly debatable principle."' The Florida Supreme
Court then granted certiorari and reversed.
In reversing, the supreme court stated:
The constitutional right of the owner of property to make
legitimate use of his lands may not be curtailed by unreasonable
restrictions under the guise of police power. The owner will not
be required to sacrifice his rights absent a substantial need for
restrictions in the interest of public health, morals, safety or
welfare. If the zoning restriction exceeds the bounds of necessity
for the public welfare, as, in our opinion, do the restrictions
controverted here, they must be stricken as an unconstitutional
invasion of property rights.' 3'
intended use, and held that the cited principle did not authorize the legislative authorities
to postpone indefinitely such reasonable use by compelling the owner to repeat endlessly
the same laborious procedures.
125. City of Gainesville v. Bishop, 174 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
126. Edelstein v. Dade County, 171 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
127. See cases collected in 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, § 38.08[4]
(1964).
128. Board of Comm'rs of State Institutions v. Tallahassee Bank and Trust Co., 116
So.2d 762 (Fla. 1959); Burritt v. Harris, infra note 129.
129. 172 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1965).
130. 166 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965). Supporting the classification originally were
the following: there were some residences in the area; petitioner's land did appreciate in
value under the residential classification; industrial uses at that particular location might
constitute a flight hazard; the airport might be moved.
131. Supra note 129, at 823.
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The Burritt case and the above quoted language has already been used in
Lawley v. Town of Golf view,' 2 to reverse a lower court decision denying
injunctive relief against an oppressive residential classification. Sig-
nificantly, the Second District Court of Appeal commented on the Burritt
case as follows:
By this holding the Supreme Court has created an innovation in
the zoning law of Florida by casting on the zoning authority the
burden of establishing by a preponderance of evidence that the
zoning restrictions under attack "bear substantially on the
public health, morals, safety or welfare of the community" if
the ordinance is to be sustained. 3
If the district court's opinion of the effect of Burritt is correct, zoning
is likely to become substantially less effective than it now is. As buffer
parcel after parcel gets judicial relief because the zoning authority can-
not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the public health,
safety or welfare depends on the classification, whole communities may
rapidly erode. However, the effect in the opinion may be a bit exaggerated.
The supreme court itself had stated that the petitioner had sustained the
burden of proving his property was unsuitable for any classification more
restrictive than Industrial A, and that respondent had failed to demon-
strate that the question was debatable.3 4 This would not seem much of a
departure, if any, from the established principle that the one attacking
the ordinance (the landowner) has the burden of proof to show that it
is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory or confiscatory., The su-
preme court's statement about a showing that the question was debatable
would also seem to put a much lesser burden on the zoning authority
than a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the classification
was necessary to protect the public health, morals, safety or welfare. In
fact, it suggests that the zoning authority need show only that the rela-
tionship between the classification and the legitimate objectives of the
police power is debatable, questionable, or possible, and then the decision
of the authority will be affirmed under the fairly debatable rule.
Of course, in the last analysis it is a value judgment as to whether
a particular classification of a particular piece of property is valid, or
fairly debatable on the issue, and the last group of persons to review the
case will necessarily have the final judgment. The long range effect of
Burritt, if any, will have to await the test of time. It does seem likely,
however, that at the least it may encourage trial and appellate courts
132. 174 So.2d 767 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
133. Id. at 770.
134. Burritt v. Harris, 172 So.2d 820, 823 (Fla. 1965).
135. Cases are collected in 2 Boyer, supra note 127, at 1418-1419. That the burden on
one attacking a zoning ordinance is an extraordinary one, City of Miami Beach v. Silver,
67 So.2d 646, 647 (Fla. 1953); Miami Beach United Lutheran Church v. City of Miami
Beach, 82 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1955).
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to review the merits and evidence more freely and critically in the future.
If this should prove to be the case, we will then have, depending on the
reader's viewpoint, more judicial interference or more judicial super-
vision or participation in the zoning decisional process.
B. What Other Cities Do Is of No Concern to Us
The tongue-in-cheek heading above might facetiously describe the
situation in Harris v. City of Coral Gables.136 The property located at
an intersection was within the City of Coral Gables and was residentially
zoned. Across one street and west of the property was a business district
located in the unincorporated area of Dade County. But to the East,
South, and across the other street to the North, the land was all zoned
residential. The court, citing Town of Surfside v. Skyline Terrace
37
Corp., held to the effect that "It was incumbent upon the appellee to
demonstrate that the zoning ordinance, as applied to its property by the
municipality wherein the property is located, was unreasonable and
arbitrary."'38 The court indicated that if it allowed the rezoning of this
particular property it would introduce a "cancer" into the area which
could set off a "chain reaction" which could ultimately destroy the master
plan the city has always adhered to. Needless to say, holding a line,
whether at municipal boundaries or simply at demarcations between
zones within a city, is a most difficult task.
C. The Demise of a Sign Ordinance
The Supreme Court of Florida did not temper its disapproval of a
patently discriminatory sign ordinance in Eskind v. City of Vero Beach. 9
After finding a jurisdictional conflict between the first and second dis-
tricts, 40 the court invalidated the Vero Beach ordinance. This ordinance
prohibited outdoor signs advertising motel rates, but signs advertising
other services of motels and signs advertising rates of other business were
not prohibited. The court found that regulation of signs is a proper
exercise of the police power, but that such exercise must not be dis-
criminatory.
The Court stated:
In the instant case, we can find no justification from an
aesthetic viewpoint to prohibit motel signs advertising rates but
permitting every other type of motel advertising signs imag-
inable .... It seems obvious to us that a rate sign in front of a
136. 157 So.2d 146 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
137. 120 So.2d 20 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
138. Supra note 136 at 147.
139. 159 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1963).
140. Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 150 So.2d 254 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963); and Abdo v.
City of Daytona Beach, 147 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963), cert. denied, 151 So.2d 53
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
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motel is no more offensive to the aesthetic sensibilities of the
traveler or the community than would be a rate sign in the same
immediate area advertising the charges of the other business
activities. 4 '
D. The Anti-Noise Ordinance, or Miami Beach Is No Longer
a "Seasonal" Resort Area
In 1937 the City of Miami Beach enacted an ordinance which pro-
hibited certain noises within an area where tourists might be disturbed.
The prohibition only extended to that period of time from December
first through March thirty-first. The plaintiff, after being cited for vio-
lating this ordinance while building a large hotel, sought injunctive relief
against the city. The trial court found, and the appellate court affirmed,
that although the ordinance was in the guise of an anti-noise ordinance,
in reality it was an anti-building ordinance which had the arbitrary effect
of precluding building during one-third of the year. The court stated
that although the ordinance might have been reasonable in 1937 when
Miami Beach was primarily a "winter resort," it is no longer such a
seasonal resort and therefore the ordinance was arbitrary and un-
reasonable.
1 4 2
E. Certiorari? And, If So, Which One?
The existence of diverse enabling acts and zoning procedures, not
only between counties and municipalities but also between municipal-
ities,' 4 has created difficulties in ascertaining the correct method of ob-
taining judicial review of zoning decisions reached at the legislative and
administrative levels. A number of cases have dealt with this problem
during the past biennium and are included for the hopeful enlightenment
of the reader. At the outset, a possible source of confusion is the presence
of two types of certiorari proceedings: one statutory,4 applicable to
municipal zoning pursuant to the general enabling act, and the other
common law or traditional, applicable generally to judicial review of the
rulings of administrative bodies.145 The difference between the two types
of certiorari is that in traditional, or common law certiorari, the only
question is whether the judgment under review is supported by the
record established at the time the decision was made. No additional testi-
mony may be taken in traditional certiorari. Statutory certiorari provides
141. 159 So.2d 209, at 211.
142. Miami Beach v. Seacoast Towers, 156 So.2d 528 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
143. Municipalities may be granted zoning authority and procedures in their charter
by special act in which case the provisions of Florida Statutes chapter 176 have limited if
any applicability. See Thompson v. City of Miami, 167 So.2d 841 (Fla. 1964), discussed
infra text following note.
144. FLA. STAT. §§ 176.16-176.19 (1963).
145. The difference was pointed out in Dade County v. Carmichael, 165 So.2d 227
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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for a trial de novo, and the court may take testimony or appoint a ref-
eree to determine additional facts in order to treat the problem on its
merits.
In Dade County v. Carmichael,'46 a property owner took certiorari
from the Board of County Commissioners after its denial of his appeal
for a change in zoning. The owner requested that the court take addi-
tional testimony and evidence in support of his position. The court re-
ferred the matter to a referee and upon his findings reversed with direc-
tions that the county rezone. The county appealed on the ground that in
traditional certiorari, the court had no power to hear additional evidence
and was in error in referring the case to a referee. The appellate court
sustained the county's position, holding that only in certiorari pursuant
to chapter 176 of the Florida Statutes applicable to municipal zoning
can review by certiorari be treated as a trial de novo.
In Sun Ray Homes v. County of Dade,'47 the court stated that:
Although certiorari may not be employed to review a legislative
action of the Board of County Commissioners, certiorari is
proper for the review of a quasi-judicial action. 48
In issue was the validity of a sign permit challenged on the basis that it
was prohibited by a provision of the Metropolitan Dade County Code. 49
A petition for certiorari was taken after the Board of County Commis-
sioners, on an appeal from the Zoning Appeals Board, affirmed the appeals
board. The affirmance of the zoning board by the County Commission
was in the form of a resolution denying the appeal. The circuit court
denied the petition for certiorari, and an appeal was taken. The appel-
lant's first point was that the Metropolitan Dade County Code section
33-316,1 0 which authorizes review by certiorari, is invalid because it
provides for review of legislative or non-quasi-judicial activities. The
court held that the remedy of certiorari was proper because:
In the instant case the action of the Board of County Com-
missioners was clearly quasi-judicial because it was a review of
an interpretation and application of an ordinance by the Zoning
Appeals Board.'
It also held, however, that denial of certiorari was proper because the
record supported the validity of the permit.
146. 165 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
147. 166 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
148. Id. at 829.
149. The applicable provision was Code section 33-118, set out in the case at p. 828,
regulating the location of signs.
150. This section, set out in footnote 1 of the case at p. 829, requires that administra-
tive remedies be exhausted before seeking judicial review and suggests that certiorari be
the method for reviewing decisions of the Board of County Commissioners.
151. 166 So.2d 827, at 829.
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In conjunction with the Sun Ray Homes and Carmichael cases, it is
necessary to consider Dade County v. Markoe,'52 a case cited in Sun
Ray Homes for the proposition that "certiorari may not be used to review
a legislative action of the Board of County Commissioners."' 58 In
Markoe, the Board of County Commissioners, contrary to the recom-
mendation of the Zoning Appeals Board, granted rezoning by resolution.
The County Commissioners subsequently, by resolution, rescinded the
first resolution and thereby restored the original zoning. The owner sought
certiorari, and the circuit court then quashed the commissioners' second
resolution. The county appealed, and the third district reversed, stating:
There is no authority of which we are aware that permits a
court, in traditional certiorari proceedings, to inquire into and
review the acts of a legislative body . . . in the enactment of
legislation.... The circuit court found, and we think correctly,
that the action of the commission in enacting the second resolu-
tion was legislative in character. This being so, there was
nothing to review, for only those decisions which have a judicial
or quasi-judicial character are subject, in proceedings of this
nature, to review.'
The distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial activity of
the Board of County Commissioners as exemplified in Sun Ray Homes
and Markoe is sound and justified. In determining whether a particular
action, such as issuing a permit for a sign, is permissible under existing
ordinances or regulations, the body is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity.
Similarly, if the body is acting as the final arbiter as to whether a
variance or special exception should be granted, it is also acting in a
quasi-judicial capacity. On the other hand, if the Board of Commissioners
is deciding whether or not to enact a new zoning ordinance, or whether
to rezone a particular parcel or area, then it is acting in a legislative
capacity.
Of the three cases just discussed, Carmichael is the one that appears
a little awkward or out of step. The difficulty with Carmichael is not so
much with the result, reversing the trial court for ordering a rezoning,
but with the basis for reaching it. In basing its reversal upon the im-
propriety of the court's considering new evidence in a traditional cer-
tiorari proceeding, the appellate court appears to be impliedly approving
certiorari as a method for reviewing legislative activities as the litigation
originated in a request for a change in zoning. It is submitted that the
reversal should have been based on the proposition that certiorari did
not lie at all. Of course, the fact that certiorari is not available in a
particular case does not mean that no review is available. Review by
152. 164 So.2d 881 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
153. Supra note 148.
154. Supra note 152 at 882 (Emphasis added.).
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a court of equity in an action for injunctive relief is available to test
the validity of the classification.
As indicated in an earlier paragraph, municipal zoning effectuated
pursuant to chapter 176 of the Florida Statutes, provides for statutory
certiorari in the nature of a trial de novo. The Supreme Court of Florida
in Thompson v. City of Miami,"" considered the application of statutory
certiorari when municipal zoning is authorized by special charter provi-
sions. In Thompson, the owner sought direct equitable relief from the
denial of his petition for a variance by the Miami City Commission. The
lower court reversed the commission over the city's objection that the
owner had not proceeded in accordance with statutory certiorari as pro-
vided in chapter 176. The city appealed and the Third District Court
of Appeal held 5 ' that the owner should have sought review by certiorari
under chapter 176. The Florida Supreme Court, quashing the district
court's finding, held that chapter 176 provisions for certiorari are only
applicable to municipal zoning cases when the zoning is authorized
pursuant to chapter 176. Accordingly, that procedure was not applicable
to City of Miami zoning effectuated under charter provisions.
The Thompson decision also indicated that direct equity action
against unconstitutional legislation has long been the traditional method
of assaulting the validity of zoning ordinances. The court went on to hold
that even had statutory certiorari been applicable, the review by that
procedure would not have been able to achieve the result obtained of
invalidating the statute as applied to the owner's property. 5 7 The owner
attacked the validity of the ordinance as applied to him and in toto.
Statutory certiorari under chapter 176 applies to a review of decisions
of administrative officials authorized to grant special exceptions or
variances but who are not authorized to hold the ordinance invalid.
In summary, the following principles appear established:
1. In attacking a municipal ordinance on the basis of its
unconstitutional application, a direct equitable action for in-
junctive relief should be employed.'
2. When a municipality has enacted its zoning ordinances
pursuant to Florida Statutes, chapter 176, the statutory review
by certiorari may be employed to review the administrative acts
of the municipality.'59
3. When a municipality has enacted its zoning ordinances
pursuant to authority other than chapter 176, statutory cer-
tiorari provided in 176 is not applicable.' 60
155. 167 So.2d 841 (Fla. 1964).
156. City of Miami v. Thompson, 159 So.2d 877 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
157. 167 So.2d 841, at 843.
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4. When a Board of County Commissioners acts in a legis-
lative capacity in enacting zoning ordinances, a direct equity
action is the only remedy. 6'
5. When a Board of County Commissioners acts as an ap-
pellate body, reviewing in a quasi-judicial capacity decisions of
inferior zoning authorities, common law certiorari is the proper
remedy. 162
F. Legislation-Junkyards and Highways
The state has now awakened to the great advantages derived from
the preservation of the natural beauties of the countryside for the
aesthetic enjoyment of the speeding motorist. Not the least of such
advantages, it may be assumed, is the opportunity to share in federal
funds for road construction. 8 Accordingly, legislation now prohibits the
creation of new junkyards along the state's highways. Florida Laws,
chapter 65-93, prohibits, except for existing non-conforming uses, the
maintenance or operation of a junkyard within 1,000 feet of any highway
right-of-way outside the limits of municipalities. Junkyards which were
operating within 1,000 feet from any highway prior to July 1, 1965, may
continue to operate provided the view from such highway is obscured
by natural objects, plantings or fences on the property line. The act also
does not prohibit existing junkyards from expanding, enlarging or in-
creasing the size of the junkyard. It also specifies the type of fence that
is required and provides that it must be kept in good order and repair,
and any advertisement thereon shall be regulated by chapter 479 of the
Florida Statutes.
V. TAXATION
A. The Agricultural Anomaly
In 1957, the legislature singled out agricultural lands for special
tax treatment.6 4 This statute, providing that lands being used for
agricultural purposes shall be assessed as agricultural lands upon an
acreage basis notwithstanding that all or part thereof may be included in
a subdivision plat or real estate development, has been the subject of
several cases during the biennium.'65 The most significant recent ex-
pression on the problem has come from the Supreme Court of Florida in
161. Dade County v. Markoe, 164 So.2d 881 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
162. Sun Ray Homes v. County of Dade, 166 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
163. Highway Beautification Act of 1965 § 101(d)-(m); 79 STAT. 1028; 23 U.S.C.
§ 131(d)-(m) (1965).
164. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-195; FLA. STAT. § 193.11(3) (1963).
165. Markham v. Blount, 175 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1965); Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So.2d
521 (Fla. 1965); Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1963) ; Matheson v. Elcook, 173
So.2d 164 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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Lanier v. Overstreet.' In a heavily divided court,'67 the constitution-
ality of the statute was upheld.
The legislation was no doubt the product of a desire to relieve
farmers who were being injured by tax assessments made on a market
value basis which contemplated the future use of the land, not for
agricultural, but rather for subdivision or other purposes. There are
equities on both sides of the question as to whether such treatment should
be allowed. However, the abuse of the privilege afforded the farmer
was no doubt the reason for the dissenting opinion in the Overstreet case.
The dissent pointed to the recent case of Matheson v. Elcook,"6 ' as an
example of an abuse or result inconsistent with constitutional limitations
upon classification. In Matheson, the owner of 67.89 acres of land,
admittedly worth in excess of two million dollars,16 challenged an as-
sessment of the land by the assessor at less than 500,000 dollars. He
contended that the assessed value should have been 54,312 dollars. His
position was that the property was a coconut plantation and although only
five of the acres was necessary to accomplish effectively the production
of the entire area, it was error for the assessor to have assessed 59.16
acres on a nonagricultural basis. The court reversed the lower court's
finding in favor of the assessor and held that if the property were being
used in good faith as agricultural land the benefits of Florida Statute,
section 193.11(3) were applicable. Accordingly the court reversed for
a determination of the value of the entire parcel as agricultural land.
Chief Justice Drew in his dissent in Overstreet was taking an "I told
you so" attitude when he referred to the Matheson case.' It is submitted
that from the standpoint of constitutional law, the dissent makes a
great deal of sense. However, the problems attendant upon the farmer
may require some special treatment. Chief Justice Drew recognized this
but stated that if such treatment or exemption is needed it should be
accomplished by constitutional amendment not pursuant to legislative
enactment which is patently discriminatory.
166. 175 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1965).
167. The court was divided in a four to three split. Justices Thornal, Caldwell and
Ervin concurred in the majority opinion written by Justice Roberts, and Justices Thomas
and O'Connell concurred in the dissenting opinion written by Chief Justice Drew.
168. 173 So.2d 164 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
169. The high value was based on use of the land for hotel, motel, or high rise apart-
ment purposes.
170. Chief Justice Drew in the dissenting opinion in Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So.2d 833,
841 (Fla. 1963), stated that:
The burden of taxation in the world in which we now live is one of concern to
every citizen-not just those who own agricultural lands. The owners of resort
hotels and businesses, operating in seasonal periods, are a class that inevitably have
problems peculiar to them. Developers of large real estate subdivisions who hold
lots for resale are another. The list is endless. A strict application of the ancient
concept of equality and uniformity-buttressed by a myriad of court decisions
and constitutional provisions-is the only way to prevent a complete erosion of
these basic concepts in an area that has plagued men from time immemorial. We
cannot-and must not-in my humble judgment make fish of one and fowl of the
other.
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B. Just Value-A Workable Definition
The Constitution of Florida in very simple terms declares that the
legislature "shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valu-
ation of all property .... ,,171 Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate,
the legislature has enacted Florida Statute section 193.021,172 which sets
standards and guidelines for assessors to follow in reaching that abstract
concept of just valuation. The confusion that has existed in the state with
regard to what comports with the just valuation concept would, of neces-
sity, require separate treatment and is beyond the scope of this survey.
Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court of Florida, in an opinion which
personifies the word clarity, has settled any confusion which heretofore
may have existed.1
78
The court has held that just valuation is synonymous with the term
"market value": Market value being defined in well worn definitive
language as "(T)he amount a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy,
would pay to one willing but not obliged to sell."'
1 74
An interesting point which was not considered by the majority
opinion was the effect of this definition on the agricultural cases decided
the same day. In a short concurring opinion Justice Roberts indicated
that he felt that the majority did not go far enough and should have re-
affirmed the reasonable classification policy evidenced in the agricultural
cases.
75
The question of the effect of this case on the agricultural problem
was later answered in Stiles v. Brown 176 to the effect that agricultural
lands must be assessed upon a basis of what a buyer will pay for the pur-
pose of "raising timber, citrus, cattle, or for other farming operations.' 77
171. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
172. FiA. STAT. 193.021 provides:
The county assessor of taxes of the several counties shall assess all the real and
personal property in said counties in such a manner as to secure a just valuation
as required by § 1, art. IX of the state constitution. In arriving at a just valuation,
the county assessor of taxes of the several counties shall take into consideration
the following factors:
(1) The present cash value of the property;
(2) The highest and best use to which the property can be expected to be put
in the immediate future; and the present use of the property;
(3) The location of said property;
(4) The quantity or size of said property;
(5) The cost of said property and the present replacement value of any im-
provements thereon;
(6) The condition of said property;
(7) The income from said property.
173. Walter v. Schuler, 176 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1965).
174. Id. at 85, 86.
175. Id. at 86.
176. 177 So.2d 672 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
177. Id. at 676.
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C. Procedural Requisites to Challenging Assessments
The question of whether a deposit of the taxes admittedly due or
payment of the taxes admittedly due, is necessary before an objection
can be made to an assessment has been answered in the negative by
the Florida Supreme Court in Collins Inv. Co. v. Metropolitan Dade
County."8 Although the statutes seem to be as clear as possible in re-
quiring the deposit or payment with the complaint, the court has held
that an offer to do equity is enough to get you into court and the statutes
are satisfied if payment is made before final relief is granted.
D. Tax Sales, Foreclosures, Costs, Attorneys' Fees, Notice of Sale
Brooks v. Florida Home Mortgage Co.,'79 overruled the first district's
prior position in Thomason v. Jernigan,80 to the effect that attorney's
fees and abstracting costs could be recovered in foreclosure proceedings
of a county tax lien. The court re-examined the Thomason file and found
that it was mistaken as to the fact that the city had foreclosed. They
stated that when an individual forecloses, there are no provisions for
recovery of attorney's fees or abstracting costs, as opposed to provisions
in chapter 173 when a city forecloses its own tax lien.'"'
In McNayr v. Cranbrook Inv., Inc.,8 2 the Supreme Court of Florida
held that in every suit seeking to challenge the validity of tax assessment,
the state comptroller must be made a party. The court allowed the
plaintiff to amend and reasoned that the amendment making the state
comptroller a party would relate back to the date the suit was filed. This
was necessary to prevent the application of the sixty day limitation
period which would preclude judicial review."8 3
The question of whether attorney's fees incurred in the foreclosure
of a mortgage will take priority over a federal income tax lien perfected
after the perfection of the mortgage but prior to the foreclosure proceed-
ings was the subject under consideration in United States v. First Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n.'84 The second district held that the government's
lien took priority. The apparent reason for the decision was a finding that
the lien for the attorney's fee did not mature until after the perfection of
the federal lien.
178. 164 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1964).
179. 165 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
180. 151 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
181. Chapter 173, FLA. STAT. (1963) authorizes the foreclosure and procedures to be
followed in municipal tax lien cases. The chapter does not apply to individuals who seek
to foreclose a municipal tax lien.
182. 158 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1963).
183. FLA. STAT. § 192.21 provides in pertinent part that:
no assessment shall be held invalid unless suit be instituted within sixty days from
the time the assessment shall become final. ...
184. 155 So.2d 192 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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In Alper v. LaFrancis,8 5 the second district held that where property
is held as a tenancy by the entirety it is necessary to mail a notice of
sale for delinquent taxes in individual envelopes to each spouse.1 8 6 It is
not enough to mail one notice addressed to both spouses. The dissent by
Justice White seems to contain a good deal of logic in applying the force
of pragmatics to the situation. His position was that since the statute
specifically states that "The failure of the owner ... to receive such
notice shall not affect the validity of the tax deed issued pursuant to such
notice,"' 87 and since in many instances in the commercial world husband
and wife participate jointly, the result is unwarranted. He stated that




Florida Law, chapter 65-281, amends Florida Statute section 192.13
providing for homestead taxation exemption to vendees in possession of
real estate by adding the words "or deeds of conveyances" after the words
"contracts to purchase." The amendment would appear to have limited
effect.
2. ASSESSMENT VALUATION; ALTERNATIVE METHOD
Florida Laws, chapter 65-433, creates statute section 193.271, to
provide an alternative method by which dissatisfied property owners may
challenge a tax valuation placed on their property by the tax assessor.
This method is not available, however, until the owner has sought relief
from the Board of County Commissioners sitting as an equalization board.
The procedure consists of the property owner filing a certificate
stating the amount he ascertains to be a just valuation of the property.
He must also file therewith a written authorization to the tax assessor
requesting and empowering him to advertise and conduct a public auction
for the purpose of receiving cash offers for the property in amounts
of not less than the amount set forth in the certificate. If bids are
received equal to or greater than the amounts set forth in the certificate,
procedures are provided for an actual sale to the highest bidder, such
procedures relating to examination of title, payment of fees, apportion-
ment of taxes and similar items. If the property owner fails to consum-
mate the sale, he shall forfeit the cash deposit or surety bond given to the
185. 155 So.2d 405 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
186. FLA. STAT. § 194.18 provides in pertinent part that:
In addition to the publication of the notice provided for by § 194.16 the clerk
of the circuit court shall mail a copy of such notice to the owner of the prop-
erty .... The failure of the owner ...to receive such notice shall not affect the




tax assessor with the written authorization, and the tax assessor shall
pay one-half of this amount to the buyer, together with a return of the
amount paid in pursuant to the buyer's bid. This shall be full and com-
plete compensation to the bidder and he shall have no other recourse
against the property owner and the tax assessor arising out of any of the
measures taken as provided in this section. The tax assessor shall retain
the remainder of the forfeited cash deposit or security bond. However
the property owner shall not forfeit the cash deposit or surety bond,
except for costs not otherwise paid, when he is unable to deliver
merchantable title acceptable to the buyer. In such an event the just
value shall be determined as otherwise provided by law. If no bid is
received at the auction, the amount set forth in the certificate shall be
established as a just valuation of the property and shall be entered on
the tax rolls of the county.
3. PARAPLEGICS' EXEMPTION
Chapter 65-193 amends Florida Statute sections 192.111 and 192.112,
relating to exemptions from taxes on property owned by paraplegic and
wheel chair veterans, by adding subsection (3) to each; to extend such
exemption on property owned by the entireties to the veteran's widow
until she sells it or remarries. She must also reside on said real estate
and use it as her domicile to be entitled to the homestead exemption.
V. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Ratione Soli-An Incorporeal Hereditament which Runs with the Fee
In a four to three decision, the Supreme Court of Florida has held
that the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission cannot prohibit the
right of a man to hunt and fish on his own land. In Alford v. Finch,'88
the state commission, in conjunction with the establishment of a game
preserve, enacted a regulation which would have prevented the owner
from taking game from his land for an indefinite period. The supreme
court held that the right to hunt game on one's land is a property right,
and inasmuch as neither the state constitution nor implementing legis-
lation conferred on the commission the power of eminent domain, the
commission could not under the guise of regulation take the owner's
property without compensation. The dissent took the position that the
omission or preclusion of the commission's power to employ eminent
domain was consistent with the conclusion that they could use their
regulatory powers to effect the same result as if eminent domain were
used. The dissent also found no authority for the recognition of a prop-
erty interest in game while it is in a wild state. The decision establishes,
however, that although the commission may set periods of time during
188. 155 So.2d 790 (Fla. 1963).
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which game may be taken during the year, it cannot prevent a property
owner from taking game for any extensive period of time as such action
would constitute a taking of private property without just compen-
sation.
B. Valuation-Factors Included and Excluded
Casey v. Florida Power Corp."9 involving the condemnation of an
easement for an electrical transmission line, held that possible de-
preciation of the remaining land because of the existence of the high
tension wires could not be considered as it would be too speculative and
would be based on fear or ignorance of possible buyers.
A novel question was presented in State Road Dep't v. Chicone,90
wherein the property condemned depreciated because of the threat of
the taking prior to the actual condemnation. The Supreme Court of
Florida, evidently impressed with the equities of the situation, held that
the property is still to be valued at the time of the taking but that such
value should be determined without the debilitating threat of condemna-
tion. The decision is eminently fair, but it may be noted that the rule is
different if at the time of taking the property has appreciated. The rule
in that situation, and it caused difficulty in the instant case,' 91 is that
the owner receives the value at the time of taking, including the ap-
preciation,192 a somewhat anomalous result.
C. Lessee-Owner within Contemplation of Statute
In State Road Dep't v. White," 8 the Supreme Court of Florida held
that a lessee for a term for years is an owner within the contemplation
of the condemnation statute providing compensation for business
damage. 94 The opinion referred to a prior third district case and over-
ruled any language in the opinion inconsistent with the present holding.1 95
189. 157 So.2d 168 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
190. 158 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1963); 18 U. MIA L. REv. 705 (1964).
191. The Sunday case, infra note 190, was distinguished in Chicone on two bases:
(1) Sunday only held that an increase in valuation could be considered, it was not con-
cerned with a decrease in valuation; (2) Sunday dealt with an appreciation arising from
a proposed public improvement; Chicone dealt with the effect on value of the imminence
of the land itself being taken. The court pointed out that when the land itself is marked for
taking it can share none of the benefits to be derived from the proposed improvement
because at that time the land will not be available for private use.
192. Sunday v. Louisville & N.R.R., 62 Fla. 395, 57 So. 351 (1912); Yoder v. Sarasota
County, 81 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1955).
193. 161 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1964).
194. FLA. STAT. § 73.10(4) provides in pertinent part that where:
... the taking of the property involved may damage or destroy an established
business of more than five years standing, owned by the party whose lands are being
so taken . . . the jury shall consider the probable effect the denial of the use of
the property so taken may have upon the said business, and assess in addition to
the amount being awarded for the taking, the probable damages to such business
which the denial of the use of the property so taken may reasonably cause. ...
(Emphasis added.).
195. The court overruled Gross v. Ruskin, 133 So.2d 759 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961). There
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D. State versus Private Corporation Condemnations
In a lengthy but well written opinion"' intended for the edification
of the bench and bar, the Supreme Court of Florida has determined the
applicability of article XVI, section 29 of the Florida Constitution. This
section provides that full compensation shall be paid "irrespective of any
benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation or indi-
vidual." The precise point in issue was whether this constitutional provi-
sion was in conflict with the legislative mandate 9 ' that in considering
the remainder damage by virtue of the taking by the state road depart-
ment or other public body, the enhancement of the remaining property
shall be used as a set-off.
The court pointed out that eminent domain is an inherent attribute
of sovereignty and does not depend upon constitutional provisions. The
courf then delved into the history of section 29 of article XVI, and
concluded that this article was intended to apply only to condemna-
tions by private corporations or individuals. As to condemnations by the
state or its agencies, it was concluded that only the more general provi-
sions of the Florida Declaration of Rights, 98 namely, that private prop-
erty shall not be taken "without just compensation," was applicable to
condemnations by the state or its agencies. It was further concluded that
the question of just compensation was a judicial and not a legislative
question, but that the state could impose upon itself or upon others
exercising the power of eminent domain the obligation to pay more
than a "just compensation." It was accordingly held that the constitu-
tional limitation providing for compensation without allowance for
enhancement of value applied only to condemnations by private cor-
porations. The statute, relating to a set-off for enhancement value when
the condemnation was by the state or an agency thereof, was not un-
constitutional.' 99
E. Miscellaneous
In Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Nay. Authority,2"' the supreme
court held that the denial of a dredge and fill permit was error where it
was not established that the granting of the permit would materially
affect the public interest. The court stated that the sale of bottom land
by the state carries with it the valuable property right to bulkhead and
fill.
The question as to whether the condemnor is bound by its estimate
were no facts in the Gross opinion but the language was to the effect that a lessee could
not recover damages for loss of business.
196. Daniels v. State Rd. Dep't, 170 So.2d 846 (Fla. 1964).
197. FLA. STAT. § 73.10(3) (1963).
198. FLA. CONST. DEGL. OF RiGHTS, § 12.
199. Daniels v. State Rd. Dep't, supra note 194.
200. 171 So.2d 376 (Fla. 1965).
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of value which is required to be filed was answered in the negative in
Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Bennett.2' The court therein held
that the estimate of value is not a minimum figure which would preclude
the introduction of testimony showing a lower value.
In a case of first impression, 2 the first district has held that venue
can be changed in eminent domain proceedings notwithstanding the
provisions in chapter 73 of the Florida Statutes providing for trial in
the county in which the lands are located.28 The condemnee sought the
change in venue on the ground that a vast majority of the citizens of the
county were shareholders in the condemnor corporation.
In Jacksonville v. Schumann, °4 the first district was confronted with
the question as to whether a complaint aJleging a cause of action for
inverse condemnation could withstand a motion to dismiss. The court held
that
The constitutional provisions applicable in Florida are
consistent with, if they do not affirmatively require, the recogni-
tion of the concept of inverse condemnation. °5
The court indicated that Florida has acknowledged that a continuing
trespass or nuisance could ripen into a taking of property, and held that
the concept of inverse condemnation would be applicable when activity
at an airport deprived nearby owners of their free and unmolested use
and quiet enjoyment of their property.
F. Legislation
Chapers 73 and 74, Florida Statutes, have been extensively amended
by Florida Laws, 1965, chapter 65-369. The effective date of the changes
was October 1, 1965, and condemnation proceedings after that date are
governed by the new legislation. Delineation of the changes would unduly
prolong this article.
Florida Laws, chapter 65-248, amends Florida Statutes section
74.141, relating to the power of eminent domain applicable to public
utilities, by extending the authorization to cover sewage distribution lines,
collection lines, intercepter lines, effluent lines and force mains only.
The chapter also creates Florida Statute section 361.07 to permit any cor-
poration owning or operating a sewer system for the public, upon making
due compensation, to enter upon and appropriate any land necessary
for the operation of such sewer system.
201. 158 So.2d 821 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
202. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Major Realty Co., 161 So.2d 837 (Fla. '1st
Dist. 1964).
203. FLA. STAT. § 73.21 (1963).
204. 167 So.2d 95 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1964).
205. Id. at 102.
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VII. VENDOR AND PURCHASER
A. Insurance-Whither Indemnity Principle?
The practical problems of insurance and its relationship to the
sale of real property is always of concern to the practitioner when
representing either the vendor or vendee. It is for this reason that
Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Boswell,206 must be discussed.
In Springfield, the plaintiffs were issued a 6,000 dollar fire policy.
Subsequently they entered into a contract for the sale of the property,
the purchase price being 12,500 dollars with a 500 dollar deposit. The
contract required the purchasers to insure against fire in an amount of at
least 7,500 dollars. The purchasers obtained a policy in an amount of
15,000 dollars. The property was destroyed by fire and the vendees
paid the vendors 12,000 dollars which they had received from their
insurance, in return for a deed from the vendors. The vendors then
sought recovery on their own 6,000 dollar policy.
The insurance company defended on the ground that the plaintiffs
had not suffered any loss since they had received the full amount under
the contract with the vendees, and that insurance is a contract of
indemnity which contemplates payment only if a loss is sustained. The
first district allowed the vendors to recover on the theory that insurance
is a contractual arrangement. The court adopted the New York, or
majority rule, to the effect that a pecuniary loss is not necessary, if at
the time of the loss the plaintiffs had an insurable interest that was
covered by the policy. 2 7 The valued policy statute20 8 aided in reaching
this result.
Sound policy arguments can be made either for or against this deci-
sion, but these writers endorse it while recognizing that it does erode the
underlying insurance concept of indemnity. The desirability of prompt
payment in case of total loss without haggling after the fact as to the
value of the destroyed property may outweigh an occasional windfall to
the insured. Further, a contrary rule may well result in windfalls to
insurers in form of premiums for which no coverage is provided be-
cause of multiple policies. The court recognized the danger of overin-
206. 167 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
207. The court referred to its prior decision in Rutherford v. Pearl Assur. Co., 164
So.2d 213 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) where the court held that the insurable interest of a vendor
by virtue of a vendor's lien was sufficient for recovery. The Court held that the vendor did
not have to go beyond a showing of the insurable interest and further allege a pecuniary
loss when she was suing for only the unpaid portion of purchase price and not for face
amount of policy. This was the first case to adopt the so called New York Rule as the
Florida position on whether the contract of insurance is one of indemnity or contract when
viewing a fire policy. The court in Rutherford, however, by way of dictum expressed a
preference for the indemnity principle in determining the measure of recovery. This dictum
was rejected in Springfield, supra note 204.
208. FiA. STAT. § 627.0801 (1963).
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surance, but concluded that if remedial action were necessary, the legisla-
ture should take it. It was also pointed out that the insurer could have
limited or prohibited additional insurance in the instant case but instead
expressly permitted it without providing for apportioning the loss in case
of casualty.
Another interesting insurance case, dealing with condemnation, was
presented to the second district in Peninsular Fire Ins. Co. v. Fowler.09
On the day that the owners of the property were served with process in
a condemnation proceeding, they procured a policy of insurance on the
property. Some months later the owners stipulated to an amount that
would be paid in the condemnation proceeding. Pursuant to the stipula-
tion, the condemnor placed the amount into the registry of the court.
The property was subsequently destroyed by fire and the owners re-
ceived the funds from the registry of the court. A suit was thereupon
brought by the condemnor and condemnee seeking the proceeds of the
fire policy. The lower court found that the final decree in the condemna-
tion proceeding which was entered prior to the fire vested the fee simple
title in the condemnor, but that inasmuch as the condemnee had not re-
ceived the funds, they had at the time Qf the loss an insurable interest.
Accordingly the court ordered that the insurance proceeds be paid to the
condemnees and that the condemnees pay the funds over to the con-
demnor. On appeal the decision was reversed. The appellate court found
that at the time of the loss the condemnees had no insurable interest.
This position was supported on the basis that at the time of the loss the
condemnors had both legal and equitable title to the property. The
statutes dealing with eminent domain prevented the condemnors from
withdrawing the funds from the registry of the court. Accordingly, at
the time of the loss the condemnees had neither equitable nor legal title.
The decision is logically sound, but perhaps a little harsh. The lower
court sought to reach a result that would appear more equitable, at least
from a layman's viewpoint. However, there seems little doubt but that
risk of loss increases as soon as the condemnees cease to occupy the
property. This fact might very well cause the policy to be cancelled, and
if so, and if the property in question were unoccupied at the time of the
loss, the correctness of the decision is further substantiated.
B. Marketable Title
The doctrine of de minimis non curat lex210 was employed as one of
two bases for granting a vendor specific performance in McLaughlin v.
Block. " ' The vendee refused to complete the transaction involving the
209. 166 So.2d 206 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
210. The law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or trifling matters. B.cCK,
LAW DiCTiONARY 482 (4th ed. 1951).
211. 159 So.2d 920 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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sale of waterfront property because the vendors failed to deliver quit
claim deeds or other suitable instruments which would indicate a divest-
ment of all outstanding possible interests in and to a dock that was on
the property as well as all possible outstanding interests in the riparian
property included in the sale. The lower court found that the vendors
had failed to comply with the provisions of the deposit receipt agreement
in this regard, but that such failure was not so substantial that the vendee
would have a right to rescind. The appellate court affirmed, finding that
even if the de minimis doctrine were not employed, the decision was
supportable on the ground that an encroachment upon a riparian right
is not an encroachment upon the title and is not enough to support
rescission.
In Peters v. Spielvogel,212 the parties entered into a contract for the
sale of a restaurant which included realty as well as personalty. The
vendors' prior tenant instituted a replevin action on some of the per-
sonalty and fixtures and the vendors posted a bond and remained in pos-
session of the property. The vendees took the position that the litigation
by the prior tenant rendered the title unmarketable and sought return
of the deposit. The vendors sought specific performance. The lower court
found for the vendees and the vendors appealed. The appellate court
affirmed, holding that the contract for sale contemplated a conveyance of
marketable title to both the realty and the personalty, and unless both
could be so conveyed the entire contract was voidable by the vendees.
Although pending litigation by the third party former tenant would
render title to the affected personalty in doubt and therefore un-
marketable, it is to be noted that the former tenant had won and had
satisfied its judgment out of the bond that the vendor posted. No time
sequence as to the tenant's suit against the vendor was indicated other
than that the suit was probably pending at the time of entry into the
contract. There was no indication as to when the suit was settled and
recovery satisfied against the bond. It is submitted, however, that if the
alleged cloud on the title was removed by satisfaction from the bond
prior to the time required for conveyance of the marketable title under
the contract terms, then the result should have been to the contrary
because the time for performance is the time that the obligation to furnish
a marketable title matures.
C. Specific Performance and the Temporary Injunction
A vendor invited the vendee to come upon the property and use it
pending completion of construction and consummation of the contract
for sale. The property was a golf course and the vendee was not required
to maintain the property except that one of its employees acted in a
212. 163 So.2d 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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supervisory capacity. The vendee indicated that it was going to vacate
the premises pending further negotiations on the contract. The vendor
then obtained a mandatory injunction which in effect ordered the vendee
to stay in occupancy. The vendee appealed and the court reversed finding
that an injunction against the breach of a contract is tantamount to a
suit for specific performance. Accordingly, without irreparable damage
there is no justification for granting it. The only damage that would have
been caused was the loss of the supervisory employee of the vendee. The
court also found that the invitation to use the property pending completion
of the contract did not give rise to any additional contract rights or
obligations separate and apart from the main contract. 13
D. General Principles Reaffirmed
Florida Statute section 731.051, rendering unenforceable an oral
contract to devise, is a statute of frauds which is an affirmative defense
which cannot be raised by motion;2 14 carpeting installed by the tackless
method remains personalty and does not become a fixture;21" and an
optionee for consideration has a right during the option period that cannot
be avoided by the optionor by action which will make his performance
impossible or more difficult.
216
VIII. COVENANTS, EASEMENTS, WATER LAW
A. Covenants
In Harris v. Sklarew,2 1 7 a grantor who never had title, conveyed by
means of a special warranty deed which provided:
And the said grantor(s) do(es) hereby fully warrant the title
to said land, and will defend the same against the lawful claims
of all persons whomsoever claiming or to claim the same, by,
through and under the grantor(s) herein.
218
The grantee brought suit for breach of the special warranty deed alleging
that the deed did not eliminate the common law covenant of seisin. The
court held that the limitation as set forth above limited all the common
law covenants, and judgment for the defendant was affirmed.
The decision is believed correct, and one of the authors herein grate-
fully acknowledges the court's citation21 9 to his writing in support thereof.
213. Professional Golfers Ass'n of America v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 166 So.2d 488
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
214. Danese v. Holley, 159 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
215. Maas Bros., Inc. v. Guaranty Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 157 So.2d 528 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1963).
216. Bigman v. Univ. Fed. Say. & Loan, 170 So.2d 330 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
217. 166 So.2d 164 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
218. Id. at 165.
219. Id. at 166.
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A little conceptual difficulty is encountered, however, in the exact ap-
plication of the court's rationale. The theory is that the common law
title covenants were included in the deed but that they were modified
by the limiting words "by, through and under the grantor." This is
a logical approach, but how do you apply it to a covenant of seisin? The
grantor covenants that he is seized "by, through and under the grantor?";
seisin in Florida being an affirmation that he has the very estate he pur-
ports to convey,22 it is difficult to modify the covenant by the above
words.
An alternative basis for the decision would be that the covenant of
seisin was not included in the deed. Covenants for title are not implied
but must be expressed in conveyances of real estate.22' However, the
statutory deed in Florida incorporates by reference the usual common
law covenants, 222 one of which, of course, is the covenant of seisin. Stat-
utes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed, 223 therefore,
it could be argued, the form of the statutory warranty deed must be
literally followed in order to incorporate the title covenants.224 In the
instant case the statutory form was followed except that the general
covenant of warranty (the only one expressed in the statutory form)
was modified by an addition of words which converted it into a special
warranty. It is submitted that this alteration changes the whole nature
and purpose of a statutory warranty deed, and therefore neither the
covenant of seisin or any other title covenant should be implied or in-
corporated without express words to that effect.
Headley v. Lewis,225 held that a covenant to make subdivision im-
provements such as streets, sidewalks and curbs was a personal agreement
which did not run with the land, and therefore could not be avoided by
conveyance of the fee. The original subdividers had contracted with the
city to make the improvements, and then they conveyed to defendants
who agreed in both their contract and deed to complete the improvements.
The grantees defaulted and in turn conveyed after time for completion
of the improvements had passed. After the subdividers completed the
improvements at the request of the city, they sued their assuming gran-
tees. In holding the grantees liable, the court also stated that even if
the covenant was one to run with the land so as to be obligatory on
subsequent grantees, a prior party could not escape by conveyance
from liability for improvements that should have been made prior to
the transfer.
220. Williams v. Azar, 47 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1950).
221. 3 Am. LAW OF PROPERTYt § 12.124 (Casner ed. 1952).
222. FLA. STAT. § 689.03 (1963).
223. Van Ness v. Royal Phosphate Co., 60 Fla. 284, 53 So. 381 (1910).
224. See supra note 221.
225. 160 So.2d 172 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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B. Easements
In Kingdon v. Walker,2 ' a grantor had provided that he would
convey a permanent easement in a good roadway within a reasonable
period of time. This provision was not in the deed, but rather in the
contract for the sale of the land. At the time of suit the grantor had
built a roadway in an area which was not owned at the time of the
original transaction. The grantee brought an action for definement of a
contractual easement, and the lower court denied declaratory relief.
On appeal the second district held that after-acquired property can be
the subject of specific performance, and located the easement thereon.
The court also held that the declaratory judgment act could be applied
to the case at bar. The location of the easement originally not specifically
defined was rendered certain under the principle of practical construction
by the conduct of the parties.
The proposition that an easement, once granted and fixed in terms
of location, cannot be changed at the whim of the grantor is vividly
brought to light in Florida Power Corp. v. Hicks . 2 7 The defendant
property owner bought the property in question subject to an easement
in favor of the power company. The company had erected lines and one
of the guy wires was in the easement. The defendant wanted to build
a filling station but could not do so and have an effective flow of traffic
unless the guy wire was relocated. The defendant's requests for relo-
cation failed and he began to construct the station anyway. The power
company sought injunctive relief on the ground that allowing the con-
tinuation of the building would be an invasion of the company's easement
rights and in addition would result in the operation of a hazardous
business adjacent to the power lines. The lower court granted a temporary
injunction but required the company to post a bond to compensate the
owner for damages if he had been wrongfully enjoined from continuing.
The owner counterclaimed seeking relocation of the wire. The lower
court ordered a relocation of the wire to another portion of the owner's
land as long as it did not impede the flow of traffic into the station. In
addition, the court assessed over 1,400 dollars costs against the company
and gave the owner a 7,500 dollar judgment against the company and
its surety for damages. On appeal, the court held that the owner of the
land has no right to interfere with the location of the easement once
established, and reversed the lower court's decision in toto.
It is submitted that the court was confronted with two unyielding
positions. The owner requested the relocation which was denied. In
spite of the denial he went ahead and commenced construction of the
station. The power company refused to relocate and in fact sought
affirmative relief when the owner began the construction. Although the
opinion does not make it picture clear how difficult it would have been
226. 156 So.2d 208 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
227. 156 So.2d 408 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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for the power company to relocate, it does make it clear that the wire
was "In front of the filling station .... ,,22s The result seems to be an
admonition to owners to respect easements on their property and not to
assume that they will be relocated or interfered with at the whim of the
owner.
An illustration of the doctrine of balancing the relative conveniences
is Ortega Co. v. Justiss.229 The grantor sought a mandatory injunction
for violation of a restrictive covenant against use of the property as a
trailer park. The court denied the injunctive relief as it would have
required the grantee to go to considerable expense and the benefit to
the grantor would have been very small. The lower court transferred the
case to the law side for damages. The appellate court affirmed finding
that the doctrine of balancing the relative conveniences of the parties
finds its most general application in cases of encroachment, but that the
"rationale of the decisions make application of the doctrine equally
applicable to cases involving violation of restrictive covenants.280
Cartish v. Soper, 2 ' has established the proposition that an easement
of access to water which was granted to all property owners in a sub-
division carries with it the implied grant to the use of the riparian rights.
The easement was created over one lot in order to give the owners in the
subdivision access to the water which lay in front of the subdivision.
The fee owner of the burdened lot attempted to plant shrubs and flowers
around the lot and the owners brought a class action to enjoin such
action. They also sought to establish their right to rebuild a dock in front
of the lot. The appellate court held that the riparian rights to build the
dock were implied from the easement which gave access to the waterway.
The implied easement which exists by virtue of a conveyance of land-
locked property was the problem in Walkup v. Becker. 2 The court found
that the common law way of necessity which has been incorporated into
the statutory law of this state contemplates a reasonable and practicable
way of ingress and egress. The fact that the owner had use of an old
road which had existed for forty-five years was not enough to prevent the
implication of the easement in view of the fact that the old road became
impassable in rainy weather.
C. Water Law
1. SURFACE WATER
New Homes of Pensacola, Inc. v. Mayne,288 reaffirmed the proposi-
tion that the servitude that the owner of higher adjoining land has on
228. Id. at 409.
229. 175 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
230. Id. at 560.
231. 157 So.2d 150 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
232. 161 So.2d 893 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
233. 169 So.2d 345 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
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the lower land is one limited to the surface water flowing naturally. The
court stated that:
No person has the right to gather, by drainage ditches, dams,
or other means, surface waters that would naturally flow in
one direction, and divert them from their natural course, and
cast them onto the lands of a lower owner to his injury." 4
2. ACCRETION, DEDICATION AND RIPARIAN RIGHTS
A subdivider had dedicated a street on the easterly portion of the
subdivision and had reserved riparian rights. The street ran along a
navigable body of water. After a number of years accretions formed on
the easterly side of the road. The owners of the lands in the subdivision
brought suit to be declared the owners of the accretions and sought in-
junctive relief against the city to prevent any interference with their
rights in the accretions. The lower court held in favor of the city and the
appellate court affirmed 235 holding that the accretions became a part
of the dedicated street. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed,236 finding
that the city had an easement in the street, and that the lot owners had
the fee interest. Although it was true that the accretions would be bur-
dened by the easement, as was the street, it did not follow that the city
could obtain the fee interest in the accretions. The court held that the
fee interest was in the owners but that the city also had an easement in
the accretions. The owners could not fill the submerged land bordering
on the accretions, but at the same time the city could not exercise any
riparian rights that were not implied by virtue of the easement. In other
words, the city could keep the accretion area open as the general public
had a right to ingress and egress to the navigable waters, but the city
could not do anything which was a riparian right by virtue of fee
ownership.
IX. CONDOMINIUMS
A number of amendments were enacted to the Florida Condominium
Law.3 ' These amendments were primarily for the purpose of clarification
and to make the provisions more certain. One amendment of a sub-
stantive nature, however, is the provision that the rule against perpetuities
shall not be applied to defeat a right given any person or entity by the
declaration for the purpose of allowing unit owners to retain reasonable
control over the use, occupancy and transfer of units.23 s Thus, pre-
emptions and options provided for in the declaration of condominium
are excepted from the rule against perpetuities. The amendment says
nothing about the rule prohibiting direct restraints on alienation, but
234. Id. at 347.
235. Burkart v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 156 So.2d 752 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
236. Burkart v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 168 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1964).
237. FLA. STAT. § 711.01-711.23 (1963).
238. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-387, § 2, amending FLA. STAT. § 711.08(2) (1963).
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perhaps threats of invalidity from that rule were not as serious as those
arising from the application of the rule against perpetuities.2 39
Another provision of a substantive nature is the statute permitting a
condominium association to acquire possessory or use interests in land
and recreation facilities for the benefit of unit owners. s40 Such facilities
may be acquired whether or not they are contiguous to condominium
lands. Acquisition of such interests are subject to the limitation imposed
by the declaration and by-laws, and the declaration and by-laws may pro-
vide that the expenses of rental, membership fees, operations, replace-
ments and other undertakings in connection therewith are common
expenses.
A clarifying amendment occurred in the statute defining condo-
minium as a form of ownership. The amendment substituted for the
words "by different owners" the phrase "one (1) or more.' 24' The stat-
ute now reads in part "form of ownership of condominium property
under which units of improvements are subject to ownership by one or
more owners, and there is appurtenant. . . ." The purpose of the amend-
ment was to eliminate ambiguity as to whether a condominium would
cease to be a condominium if all units were purchased by an individual,
or a single developer (declaror) must first sell one unit subsequent to
recording the declaration before there exists a condominium form of
ownership.
Florida Statute section 711.12(2), relating to the powers of the
association, was amended by the addition of the words "and shall have
power to execute contracts, deeds, mortgages, leases, and other instru-
ments by its officers.1 242 These words were added to make it clear the
authority of the non-corporate condominium association was not limited
to contracting, bringing suits, and being sued, but included the power
to execute any and all instruments affecting real property interests, as
if it were a corporation.
Another amendment relating to the powers of the association pro-
vides that, whether or not incorporated, the association shall have the
power, unless prohibited by the declaration, articles of incorporation, or
by-laws of the association, to purchase units in the condominium and
to acquire and hold, lease, mortgage and convey the same.24 1 The purpose
of the amendment was to eliminate any doubt that the association,
whether it be incorporated or not, should have such powers so long as the
declaration did not specifically forbid them.
239. See generally on this subject: Boyer & Spiegel, Land Use Control: Pre-emptions,
Perpetuities and Other Restraints, 20 U. Mki As, L. REV. 148 (1965).
240. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-9, creating FLA. STAT. § 711.24 (1965).
241. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-387, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 711.03(1) (1963).
242. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-387, § 4.
243. Id. § 5, amending FLA. STAT. § 711.12 (1963) by the addition of subsection (8).
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The statute relating to termination was amended by changing "un-
divided interest" in both subsection 1 and subsection 2 to read "undi-
vided share." '244 These amendments make no change in substance but
are designed to make the terminology more consistent with the other
provisions of the act. Another amendment added to the original act a
sentence to make it clear that subsequent to the termination of a condo-
minium in any manner, the liens upon the condominium parcel shall be




The statute relating to zoning was amended to make it clear that
although condominium parcels are recognized for certain purposes as
individual residential dwellings, laws, ordinances, building regulations,
and zoning applicable to other type buildings used for a similar purpose
are also applicable to condominium projects. 24 6 The amended section is
longer and more explicit than the original statute.
X. MECHANICS' LIENS
There were no reported decisions under the new Florida Mechanics'
Lien Law,2 41 but a number of amendments were enacted. Florida Statute
section 84.031(3), providing liens for professional services, was amended
by the addition of a provision that no lienor under this section shall be
required to file a mandatory notice to the owner.248
Section 84.041, relating to subdivision improvements, was changed
from "any person who, pursuant to a direct contract" to "any lienor, who
regardless of whether in privity" performs services for subdivision im-
provements shall have a lien as provided by this section.24 9 The amend-
ment thus broadens the coverage from those who were in privity (pur-
suant to a direct contract) to improvers whether in privity or not. The
statute also makes it clear that the enumeration of improvements therein
is not exclusive but that other improvements might also qualify. This
is accomplished by the addition of the words "but shall not be limited to"
in enumerating the improvements. Construction of canals has been added
to the improvements enumerated.
Section 84.051, relating to liens or persons in privity, was amended250
by deleting the phrase relating to priority because the phrase was repe-
titious of the language used in section 84.071. The amended act also pro-
vides that no lienor under this section shall be required to serve the
244. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-387, § 7, amending FLA. STAT. § 711.16(1) and (2) (1963).
245. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-387, § 7, amending FLA. STAT. § 711.16(3).
246. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-387, § 8, amending FLA. STAT. § 711.21 (1963).
247. FA. STAT. ch. 84 (1963).
248. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-456, § 1.
249. Supra note 248, at 1 2.
250. Supra note 248, at § 3.
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mandatory notice to the owner. It appears that the amendment provides
that a lienor not in privity with the owner who later becomes in privity
with the owner need not serve the mandatory notice.
Section 84.061(3), relating to liens of persons not in privity and
proper payments, was amended by the addition of subsection (3) (c) 4.251
This provides that a lienor who did not serve the mandatory notice to
the owner but who is named in a contractor's affidavit shall not be paid
until all lienors giving notice, and lienors listed in the affidavit whose
time for serving such notice has not expired, have been paid in full.
Thereafter, payment shall be made to the lienors who fail to serve a
timely notice to the extent of such balance due to the contractor "pro-
vided, this shall not be construed to permit any claim or demand what-
soever by said persons failing to serve timely notice against the owner."
This last provision is not clear but probably means that the added para-
graph shall not be construed to allow a claim against an owner by a
lienor who fails to serve the mandatory notice.
A provision is added to subsection (3) (d)2 that lienors listed in
the contractor's affidavit, not giving notice, may be paid nevertheless.25
Subsection (4) of section 84.061, which was repetitious of section
84.071, and provided that liens would take effect from recording the
notice of commencement was repealed. 58
Section 84.071, relating to priority of liens, was amended by deleting
from subsection (3) the words, "except as otherwise provided for liens
under this chapter." '254 This subsection provides that mortgages recorded
prior to the time a lien attaches, and any proceeds thereof, regardless of
when disbursed, shall take priority over the lien. The deletion eliminates
the question of what the quoted language meant and assures protection
for the construction mortgage as long as it is recorded before recordation
of the notice of commencement.
Subsections 4 and 5 of the 1963 section 84.071 are combined in
subsection 4 by the 1965 legislation. 25 The terms default and aban-
donment have been replaced by "ceases before completion." It is prob-
ably desirable to eliminate any distinction between default and aban-
donment, but it is doubtful whether the amendment increases the cer-
tainty of determining the priority of liens for materials and services
furnished subsequent to recommencement.
Section 84.081(3), relating to the claim of lien, was amended by
251. Supra note 248, at § 4.
252. Ibid.
253. Supra note 248, at § 5.
254. Supra note 248, at § 6.
255. Ibid.
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adding a blank space in the lien form for the name of the lienor when the
claim of lien is executed by a person other than the lienor 56
Section 84.091, authorizing a single claim of lien for improvements
on more than one lot and similar situations, was amended by deletion of
the word "except" prior to enumeration of the circumstances under which
the 1963 act intended a single claim of lien to be sufficient. 57 The addi-
tion of the word "except" under the 1963 act actually excluded those
circumstances from authorizing the use of a single claim of lien. The
amendment eliminates an obvious ambiguity.
Section 84.131, relating to notice of commencement, was amended
by adding to subsection (1) a provision that an owner shall record a
notice of commencement "whether or not a project has a payment bond
complying with section 84.231 F.S."25
Subsection 4 was added to the notice of commencement statute to
provide that an owner constructing subdivision improvements described
in section 84.041 need not file a notice of commencement.259 Subsection 5
was also added which provides that the notice of commencement, un-
less otherwise provided therein or in an amended notice, shall not be
effective as to any person acquiring title or any interest in real property
from the owner or under him after one year from the date of recording
the notice of commencement. s60 It is uncertain what effect the provision
has where a project has not been completed for more than ninety days
at that time. The reason for this statement is that a lienor may under
section 84.081 file his claim of lien at any time during the progress of
the work or thereafter but not later than ninety days after the final
furnishing of the labor, services or materials by the lienor.
Section 84.161, relating to demands for a copy of contract and
statements of account, is amended by the requirement that the demand
must be a "written" demand of an owner or a lienor.26'
Section 84.181, relating to the manner of serving notices, was
amended by deleting the requirement of receipt of registered or certified
mail by the person to be served notice, and substituting "and evidence of
delivery." '262 It is not clear whether the act as amended means evidence
of delivery to the person to be served or evidence of delivery to such
person's last known address.
Section 84.191, relating to the assignments of liens, was amended
256. Supra note 248, at § 7.
257. Supra note 248, at § 8.
258. Supra note 248, at § 9.
259. Ibid.
260. Ibid.
261. Supra note 248, at § 10.
262. Supra note 248, at § 11.
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by deletion of the requirement that the assignment of lien shall be by
written instrument signed and acknowledged in the manner provided for
recording conveyances of real property.263 The act now simply provides
that a lien, except that of a laborer, may be assigned at any time before
its discharge.
Section 84.221, relating to the duration of liens, was amended by
adding to subsection (2) a provision for an election to shorten the time
for enforcing a claim against a bond or other security under Florida
Statute section 84.231 or section 84.241.264 The original statute for
shortening the period did not include the provision relating to a claim
against a bond.
Section 84.231, relating to payment bond, was amended by insertion
of the word "original" before the words "contract price." The act now
provides that the amount of the bond must be at least the amount of the
original contract price.265
Section 84.241, relating to transfer of liens to security, was amended
in subsection (4) by the addition of a provision requiring the clerk of
the circuit court to return the security deposited with him when it appears
that the transferred lien has been satisfied of record.2 66
Florida Statute section 84.261, relating to consolidation and inter-
vention, was repealed.267
263. Supra note 248, at § 12.
264. Supra note 248, at § 13.
265. Supra note 248, at § 14.
266. Supra note 248, at § 15.
267. Supra note 248, at § 16.
